Withholding Democracy: The Timeliness of Self-Governance in a PostConflict Occupation by Brugnoli, L. Amber
Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 2 Article 2 
2018 
Withholding Democracy: The Timeliness of Self-Governance in a 
PostConflict Occupation 
L. Amber Brugnoli 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
L. A. Brugnoli Withholding Democracy: The Timeliness of Self-Governance in a PostConflict Occupation, 
15 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 131 (2018). 
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr/vol15/iss2/2 
This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Loyola University Chicago International Law Review by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For 
more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu. 
WITHHOLDING DEMOCRACY:
THE TIMELINESS OF SELF-GOVERNANCE
IN A POST-CONFLICT OCCUPATION
L. Amber Brugnoli*
Abstract
In December 2017, the Human Rights and Election Standards initiative at the
Carter Center,' in collaboration with United Nations Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), issued a Plan of Action that was the culmi-
nation of two years of analysis and debate regarding a human rights approach to
elections. 2 Part of their plan recognized the need for well-written and targeted
recommendations for implementing a transition to democracy.3 This article is a
first step towards drafting such recommendations.
The right to free and fair elections is a well-established norm in international
law; some scholars even argue it is a fundamental human right.4 Research and
scholarly works in this area focus heavily on elections in newly-formed democra-
cies within the developing world following civil war or other internal strife; little-
to-no attention is paid to the responsibility an occupying power has to implement
free and fair elections after it is victorious in armed conflict. While it is generally
recognized no single electoral method is suitable to all nations and peoples, sig-
nificant international and regional treaties, including the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the
Charter of the Organization of American States, protect the claim of citizens to
* Assistant Dean, West Virginia University College of Law & Adjunct Professor, West Virginia
University Department of Political Science. J.D., Ph.D. and M.A., West Virginia University; M.S., Troy
University; B.A. & B.A., West Virginia University; United States Air Force JAG Corps: Active Duty
2004-08 with tours in Okinawa, Japan and Baghdad, Iraq; Reserves 2008-Present, currently assigned to
Air Force Administrative Law Division, Pentagon. This article includes research conducted for comple-
tion of the author's doctoral dissertation; therefore, acknowledgement and thanks go to Professors Jim
Friedberg and Scott Crichlow and Associate Dean Greg Elkins for their support during that process. Also,
many thanks to Professors Jena Martin and Amy Cyphert for their first-reading of this article, and to
Professors Kirsha Trychta, Elaine Wilson, Atiba Ellis, and Josh Fershee for their advice and recommen-
dations during the drafting and submission process.
I The Carter Center was founded by former U.S. President James "Jimmy" Carter. Its mission, in
partnership with Emory University, is guided by a fundamental commitment to human rights and the
alleviation of human suffering. It seeks to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democ-
racy, and improve health. The Center is based in Atlanta, GA.
2 See Human Rights and Election Standards, EiECTION STANDARDS AT THE CARTER CENTER (2018),
http://electionstandards.cartercenter.org/at-work/hres/ [hereinafter CARTER CENITR], for details of this
initiative and its Plan of Action.
3 For the Project's full Plan of Action see generally Human Rights and Election Standards: A Plan
of Action (Dec. 2017), http://electionstandards.cartercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/HRESPlan
ofAction-web.pdf [hereinafter Plan of Action].
4 See CARTER CENTER, supra note 2 for the partnership between the Carter Center and several
offices of the UN on Human Rights and Election Standards.
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universal and equal suffrage.5 What is not established are the obligations on a
victor and occupier, post-conflict, to enact free and fair elections for the people
they now govern, even when the purpose of the conflict was to promote a demo-
cratic way of life. 6 The issue is particularly salient when a long-term occupation
is established, effectively removing the defeated nation's ability to govern itself.
And if the occupier is a long-standing democratic nation, even less attention is
given to whether their decisions regarding electoral methods meet internation-
ally-established norms.7
As a cornerstone of democracy, self-rule should be enacted as soon as possi-
ble, even if it results in new and less-experienced political leaders, but even the
most basic question surrounding an alleged human right has yet to be answered:
How soon post-conflict should the election process begin? Timeliness of elec-
tions for transitioning democratic nations is a new area of research. The impor-
tance of determining the appropriate time for implementing elections, with the
proposition earlier is better, is illustrated in this article through three case studies
wherein a victorious Western occupier (the United States) oversaw a transition to
democracy. The first two case studies examine the post-World War II occupa-
tions of Japan and Germany, which contrast a short- and long-term timeline for
implementation of a new national government, but also include early local and
regional elections to promote self-governance and democratic roots. The third
case is 2003 Iraq, which is an example of a long-term process-more than two
years-leading up to the first democratic elections at the national level with no
earlier votes at local or regional levels. Each of these separate approaches im-
pacted party formation, demographic and social representation, and make-up of
the respective nation's long-term govermpent. A model approach is then
presented, advocating for early, albeit not perfect, elections for the purpose of
promoting democracy (i.e., citizens learn by doing) and establishing national le-
gitimacy on the global stage through sovereignty.
5 G.A. Res. 14668, at 171 (Dec. 19, 1966); G.A. Res. 217 A, art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948); European
Convention of Human Rights, CouNcIL oF EUROP17 (June 1, 2010), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
ConventionENG.pdf; Charter of the Organization of American States, A-41, June 10, 1993.
6 See, for example, the U.S.'s occupation of Iraq in 2003. The purported purpose of the invasion and
subsequent occupation was, according to President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair,
a coalition aimed "to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for
terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people." President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (March 22, 2003), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/re-
leases/2003/03/20030322.html.; However, the initial UN Resolution recognizing Iraq's occupation sim-
ply acknowledged the role of the U.S. and UK as occupying powers in Iraq and turned over control of the
nation's oil exports to them. S.C. Res. 1483 (May 22, 2003); Three subsequent resolutions provided only
vague references to short-term political institutions that should be established by the occupiers, and these
concessions were largely in exchange for allowing the continued use of force in the country. For discus-
sion see Ellen Paine, The "Multinational Force" Mandate (Nov. 16, 2007), https://www.globalpolicy.org/
component/content/article/168/36717.html.
7 See generally supra note 6.
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I. Introduction
In April 2003, the world watched as U.S. Marines toppled a statue of Saddam
Hussein in Firdos Square in Baghdad while thousands of jubilant Iraqis cheered
them on.8 It was a symbol of what was happening around the country: one of the
harshest and most brutal dictatorships in the world was falling, opening the way
to a new life of freedom. For the first time in 30 years, the citizens of Iraq would
control their own destiny-or so they thought. Instead, following the cessation of
formal armed conflict, Iraqis saw their country descend into anarchy as they were
governed by foreign occupiers and exiled politicians from behind thick concrete
walls.9 Their only interactions with governing officials came when these individ-
uals deigned to visit local communities in armored cars, escorted by heavily
armed bodyguards and wearing Kevlar vests.' 0 And as the violence escalated and
quality of life plummeted, they were repeatedly told by these same officials that
Iraqis were not yet capable of governing themselves, and that they should put
their trust in the American occupation. It would take more than two years for
Iraqis to get their first taste of democracy.'
8 ABC News, April 9, 2003.
9 For detailed accounts of events in Iraq from 2003-04, see LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED Vic-
TORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE BUNGLED EFFORT To BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ (2005);
PAUL L. BREMER, III & MALCOLM MCCONNELL, MY YEAR IN IRAQ: THE7 STRUGGLE TO BUILD A FUTURE
OF HOPE (2006); PETER GALBRAITH, THE END OF IRAQ: How AMERICAN INCOMPETENCE CREATED A WAR
WITHOUT END (2006), to name just a few of the available works on this topic.
10 Diamond, supra note 9, and Peter Van Buren, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for
the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People, AMERICAN EMPIRE PROJECr (2011).
I Id. Larry Jay Diamond is a political sociologist and leading contemporary scholar in the field of
democracy studies. He is a professor at Stanford University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution,
a conservative policy think tank. He has published extensively in the fields of foreign policy, foreign aid,
and democracy and serves as the director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of
Law. Diamond has served as an advisor to numerous governmental and international organizations at
various points in his life, including the U. S. Department of State, United Nations, World Bank, and U.S.
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In February 2015, the Carter Center1 2 hosted a two-day conference on human
rights and elections standards.13 The conference was co-chaired by former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter and U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights
Ivan Simonovi6.1 4 Over the next two years, key players in the field of human
rights and election observation would work to develop guiding principles for co-
operation between the two fields as part of the Center's Human Rights and Elec-
tions Standards initiative.1 5 A key take-away from their eventual Plan of Actionl 6
was the need for well-written and targeted recommendations for implementing a
transition to democracy. The Plan stressed the importance of recommendations
that are "specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound,' 7 as appro-
priate, as well as sensitive to the country context".1 8 This article is a first step
towards drafting such recommendations.
Elections have been an integral part of the democratization process globally,
as they are an institutionalized attempt at actualizing the essence of democ-
racyl9-rule of the people, by the people, and for the people. While there are
many views on what democracy is or ought to be, a common denominator among
modern democracies is elections. 20 Indeed, the role of elections in a democracy
cannot be overstated. Every modem definition of representative democracy in-
cludes participatory and contested elections perceived as the legitimate procedure
for the translation of rule by the people into workable executive and legislative
power. 2 1 Though elections by themselves are not sufficient to make a democracy,
no other institution precedes elections in instrumental importance for self-gov-
Agency for International Development. In 2003, he was requested by President George W. Bush to serve
as senior policy advisor to the coalition in Iraq. In this role, he repeatedly urged the rapid construction of
an interim Iraqi government through a transparent and legitimate process of dialogue. On both the war
and post-war activities, the Bush administration ultimately pursued policies very different from what Prof
Diamond recommended.
Peter Van Buren served in the U.S. Department of State for 24 years and spent a year in Iraq as part
of a provincial reconstruction team. Following publication of his book, the Department of State began
adverse proceedings against him, alleging he had not properly cleared his book for public release. Van
Buren then chose to retire.
12 Supra, note 1.
13 See CARTER CENTER, supra note 2 for detailed summaries of this conference and all subsequent
gatherings for the Project.
14 Id.
15 Id. The Initiative is founded on the belief that greater and more sustained interaction between the
international elections community and human rights mechanisms is needed to promote electoral reform,
strengthen democratic governance, and foster the evolution of relevant international law on elections.
16 Plan of Action, supra note 3.
17 Together, these aims create the acronym SMART, a method of goal-setting attributed to Peter
Drucker's Management by Objectives Toolbox found in his 1954 book. See PErER DRUCKER, THE PRAC-
TICE OF MANAGEMENT (1954). It is a widely accepted way to ensure objectives are clear and reachable.
18 Plan of Action, supra note 3.
19 G. POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL
VIsioNs (2000).
20 Oluwakemi Ayanleye, Elections as a Tool of Democratization in Africa, 60 OIDA INT'L J. OF
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 143, 156 (2013).
21 STAFFAN I. LINDBERG, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS IN AFRICA (2006).
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ernment. 22 Elections in newly democratizing countries do not signal the comple-
tion of the transition to democracy, but rather foster liberalization and a self-
reinforcing power for increased democracy.23 In order to cement democratic
principles in new democratic nations, therefore, it is vital for citizens to experi-
ence an election process as early as possible.
According to the National Democratic Institute (NDI), genuine elections are
not merely a technical endeavor; they are a fundamental human right linked to a
broad array of institutions and to the ability of citizens to exercise other civil and
political rights. 24 Elections perform three major roles: 1) they are a vehicle for
the participation of citizens in the democratic process and they help to build
capacities central to achieving accountable, democratic governance; 2) they aid
in bringing better quality of life by linking voters' interests to the act of selecting
a candidate, party, or policy through public discourse; and 3) they are a means for
managing the potential for violent conflict and advancing human security. 2 5 In
2015, then-UN Assistant Secretary General for Human Rights (and now UN Spe-
cial Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect) Ivan Simonovic stated a human
rights approach 26 to elections has been proven to equitably and sustainably em-
power people to claim their rights, mobilize support, and build accountability
because this approach uses human rights principles and obligations, including
freedom from discrimination, to guide elections work.27
Yet there is a gap in public international law in relation to electoral
processes.28 Election observer groups do not generally present their findings to
human rights bodies and elections-related recommendations issued by the United
Nations and its various human rights organs are commonly offered to states al-
ready under review; 29 little attention is given to those nations just beginning their
transition to free and fair elections, whether they are attempting to do so on their
own or under the administration of an occupier. Human rights actors are con-
ducting capacity-building exercises on electoral issues, but they are not necessa-
rily designed and implemented in coordination with the elections community. 30
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Political Parties, NATIONAi. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, https://www.ndi.org/what-we-do/political-
parties (last visited on January 26, 2018).
25 Id.
26 For a more detailed discussion of this approach, see a summary of comments from the February
2017 Carter Center conference. Summary of Proceedings, HUMAN RIGHTS & Euic-ION STANDARDS (Feb.
11-12, 2015), http://electionstandards.cartercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/HRES-Conference-
Feb-1I1-12-2015-Final-Summary-of-Proceedings.pdf.
27 Ivan Simonovic, Opening Remarks at the Carter Center's Conference on Human Rights and Elec-
tion Standards (Feb. 11, 2015).
28 Avery Davis-Roberts, Introductory Address at the Carter Center's Conference on Human Rights
and Election Standards (Feb. 11, 2015).
29 Hernan Vales, Panel Discussion on Global Human Rights Mechanisms and Election Standards at
the Carter Center's Conference on Human Rights and Election Standards (Feb. I1, 2015).
30 Michael O'Flaherty, Presenter on Cooperation and Coordination Between Election Observers and
Human Rights Mechanisms at the Carter Center's Conference on Human Rights and Election Standards
(Feb. 11, 2015).
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Only after grave injustices occur on a broad scale do international governing
bodies start to intervene. 3 1 While this restraint pays tribute to the sanctity of
sovereignty in international law, it does little to prevent continued suffering and
oppression in the nations at issue. Perhaps a better course of action would be akin
to the consideration of reasonable limits on democratic rights necessary to pre-
vent political activities aimed at abrogating the rights of other groups32-interna-
tional standards could establish expectations regarding elections timelines and
criteria, the violation of which would be considered an act against fundamental
human rights. The framework presented in this article is intended to provide gui-
dance for just that purpose.
Section II of this article will explain the legal basis and obligations-or lack
thereof-of occupying powers, including the evolution of these obligations since
the Second World War, and discuss the current status of 'occupation law'. Sec-
tion III presents three occupation cases studies-Germany, Japan, and Iraq-and
compares/contrasts the timing and implementation of their respective election
processes and final formation of a sovereign government. Section IV then relies
on the analysis of these case studies to propose a model framework for future
occupations that would establish expectations and guidelines for implementing
free and fair elections to meet human rights obligations under international law.
Section V concludes with the recommendation that even though some nations
may be on shaky ground in the beginning, it is far better to start them on the path
to self-governance as soon as it is reasonably possible, rather than wait for the
"perfect" set of factors to present themselves.
There is a need to find a solution to the dilemma of timing elections: while the
post-conflict period is often the best time to push for reform, stakeholders are
frequently fatigued.3 3 Also, as will be highlighted in the case studies, there are
frequently pressing humanitarian concerns, security dilemmas, and logistical hur-
dles demanding the occupier's attention, making it easy to delay what may be
viewed as simply "procedural matters". Elections, the drafting of new laws, and
selecting new leaders and other democratic norms may seem superfluous-at
least in the short term-when a Western nation is running the show, because
there is little fear such a nation would pose a threat to eventual democratic self-
31 See, e.g., international interventions in Columbia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, South Sudan, the Philippines, Nepal, and Rwanda. In every case,
human casualties were high even before there was discussion of a coordinated, international response.
32 Such an approach is taken in most domestic constitutions in democratic nations, including South
Africa, Canada, the United States, and members of the European Union. (Compiled language available at
www.hrcr.org/safricallimitations/limitation.doc).
33 This assertion is true across all types of reform. See Susan Nicolai, Opportunities for Change:
Education Innovation and Reform During and After Conflict, International Institute for Educational Plan-
ning 138 (2009); M. P. Bertone, M. Samai, J. Edem-Hotah, & S. Witter, A window of opportunity for
reform in post-conflict settings? The case of Human Resources for Health policies in Sierra Leone,
2002-2012, Conflict and Health 8, 11 (2014); Graciana del Castillo, Economic Reconstruction and Re-
forms in Post-Conflict Countries, Center for Research on Peace and Development, Working Paper 25
(2015); Press Release, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT STATES CRITICAL TO
CONSOLIDATING PEACE, REPORT NEEDED AIMED AT IMPROVING UN EFFECTIVENESS,
SECURITY COUNCIL SAYS, UN Press Release SC/8958 (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.un.org/press/en/
2007/sc8958.doc.htm.
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government. But regardless of the occupier's status, an occupation power is not a
government "of the people, by the people, and for the people" 34. Without clearer
guidelines and expectations asserting that free and fair elections are as substantial
a human right as the concepts of equality and due process-in fact, the latter
items often stem from the former-the status quo of occupation government
could extend indefinitely, especially when the occupying officials can point to
numerous other demands some may view as more pressing priorities. 35 Demo-
cratically-elected lawmakers are more likely to respect human rights of all kinds,
including those of woman and girls. 3 6 If a nation is proclaiming itself as a new
democracy and yet is delayed in the most fundamental exercise of democratic
rights-voting-the resulting lack of capacity for the population to implement
change or an inability to imagine a different outcome from the troubled one they
have known can dampen will and limit the scope of creative solutions. 37 The case
studies outlined below illustrate this fact all-too-clearly, and the model frame-
work presents a possible solution for holding occupiers accountable, a solution
that does not currently exist in international law.
II. History of Modern Occupation Law
When the United Nations was established, the word "democracy" was not
mentioned in its Charter. 3 8 The question of democracy was only indirectly ad-
dressed by means of the then-newly accepted concept of human rights, briefly
mentioned in the UN Charter 39 and later embodied in the 1948 Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights (UDHR).4 0 Article 21(3) of the UDHR proclaimed the
right to free and fair elections by stating "[t]he will of the people shall be the
basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free procedures".41 Though ambiguous, this
article may be construed as making elections the basis of every legitimate gov-
ernment.4 2 The right to free and fair elections was reaffirmed by Article 25 of the
34 By its very nature, an occupying power is a foreign, external being; its authority cannot be consid-
ered as stemming from the people, regardless of the intent of the occupation. JiFvRi-y LHHAM &
SHIRELLH PHELPS, Wis-r's ENcYcooEIA ot; AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the definition of
"military occupation").
35 For example, in Iraq, serious violence and acts of insurgency made security a major concern within
the first two months of the occupation. As will be discussed in the case studies in Section 111, however,
Germany and Japan also faced serious humanitarian concerns (though of a different type) and occupation
officials were able to overcome them within six months.
36 James Carter, Former U.S. President, Remarks on the Use of Election Standards by Observers
(Feb. 12, 2015).
37 Chad Vickery, Speech on Human Rights and Election Standards at the International Foundation
for Electoral Systems (2015).
38 UN Charter, 1945: http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/.
39 See id. at art. 1, 13, 55, 62, 68, and 76.
40 G.A. Res. 217 A (Dec. 10, 1948), http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
41 Id. at art. 21(3).
42 Although the UDHR, as a UN General Assembly Resolution, is not considered a legally binding
instrument, the overwhelming majority of nations who voted in its favor and its continuous affirmation
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1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is
binding on states that have signed or ratified it.43 The first UN document to di-
rectly consider a right to democracy was the General Assembly Resolution of 21
November 1997, entitled "Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts
of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies.""
Generally, this resolution sought to express the UN's support for those nations
attempting to achieve democracy and to examine options available for strength-
ening that support.4 5
When a nation first achieves independence, whether through internal uprising
or revolt against an external power, most have democracy thrust upon them,
without the benefit of developed democratic institutions and systems. 4 6 In Africa,
this created a political leadership vacuum, as most newly elected leaders were
inexperienced in the art of governance. 47 The leadership void permitted the rise
of many military and autocratic leaders throughout the continent.4 8 Typically,
however, these scenarios are left to play out, deemed to be problems the new
nation must resolve on their own; only when truly heinous atrocities occur does
the international community move to intervene in a sovereign nation's indepen-
dent governance.4 9 But what about in those situations where a nation has already
intervened? Post-conflict, what are the responsibilities of the intervening state to
ensure the fundamental human right of elections are delivered to the people?
It is important to note the difference between human rights law and transi-
tional justice:5 0 whereas human rights law focuses on strengthening and protect-
ing the basic rights and fundamental freedoms inherent to all human beings,5 1
over the years have led several authors to assert its guidelines have become part of customary interna-
tional law. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 287, 322 (1995-96); see also Thomas M. Franck, The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance 86 AM. J. INr'i. L. 46, 61 (1992).
43 Anastasia Mavrommatis, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Its Role in
Promoting Democracy, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY FOR THzE 21ST CENTURY 255 (Kalliopi
Koufa ed., 1999)(describing the role of the ICCPR in the promotion of democracy).
44 G.A. Res. 52/18 (Jan. 20, 2002).
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Richard Joseph, Democracy and Reconfigured Power in Africa, BROOKINGS CURRENT
HISTORY 324 (2011) (detailing the power vacuums that often result at the end of armed conflicts); Dia-
mond, supra note 9 (discussing the situation in Iraq).
47 See Ayanleye, supra note 20, at 144.
48 Id.
49 Supra note 31.
50 In the 1990s, various American academics coined the term "transitional justice" to describe the
different ways countries had approached the problems of new regimes coming to power and facing the
massive rights violations of their predecessors. The term took hold due to the great interest in the way
former Soviet Bloc countries were dealing with the legacy of totalitarianism. Over time, particular mech-
anisms have developed and become recognized as approaches to transitional justice, including prosecu-
tions, fact-finding or "truth-seeking" inquiries, reparations programs, and reform initiatives. See
International Center for Transitional Justice, available at https://www.ictj.org/about [hereinafter ICTJ].
51 See The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, available at http://www.un.org/en/sec
tions/universal-declaration/foundation-intemational-human-rights-lawlindex.html (discussing the basis of
international human rights law).
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transitional justice is defined as the legitimate response to massive violations of
human rights; 52 thus, the latter is a result of a failure in the former.
Following mass atrocities and systematic abuses of power, transitional justice
aims may include establishing accountable institutions and restoring the public's
confidence in them; making access to justice a reality for the most vulnerable in
society; ensuring marginalized groups play an effective role in a new, just soci-
ety; building respect for the law; and facilitating the peace process and develop-
ing durable resolutions of conflicts.53 Each of these aims would appear to match
easily with the goals of a democratic nation; in fact, they would overlap consider-
ably. It would seem that offering the people a chance at self-governance might, in
itself, be a strong form of transitional justice. In fact, some of the recommenda-
tions in the model framework in Section IV include best practices from transi-
tional justice scholars. By including these practices, the model seeks to inform
and solidify the fact that free and fair elections are a fundamental human right,
and their past absence, or a failure to provide them in the present, should be
addressed as a need for transitional justice in order to renew the public's faith in
their new government.
"Occupying Power" is the legal term for countries occupying an adversary's
territory. 54 When Iraq fell to U.S. and British forces in 2003, it spurred many
international legal scholars to reexamine the basic requirements of occupation
law, given the extensive nature of the occupation and frequency with which ex-
traterritorial military occupations had been occurring during the previous dec-
ade.5 5 The Annexed Regulations to the Hague Convention IV of 1907, the 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention, and customary international law set forth the laws of
belligerent occupation, 56 and both the Nuremberg Tribunal5 7 and a 1993 Report
52 ICTJ, supra note 50.
53 Id.
54 The definition of occupation and the obligations of the occupying power were initially codified at
the end of the nineteenth century. The definition still in force and commonly used nowadays is the one
contained in the Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth
Hague Convention of 18 August 1907 (H.IV). Section III of the regulations details the rights and obliga-
tions of the military authority over enemy territory (Arts. 42-56). These are very old regulations that,
according to the International Court of Justice, have acquired the status of international customary law.
55 International Committee for the Red Cross Report on Occupation and Other Forms of Administra-
tion of Foreign Territory, Nov 2010, available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/inter-
view/2012/occupation-interview-2012-06-l l.htm [hereinafter ICRC Report] (noting the various
occupations that occurred during the 1990s following the internal conflicts that arose after the break-up
of the Soviet Union).
56 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations] (stating that a "territory is considered occupied when it is
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory
where such authority has been established and can be exercised".); Geneva Conventions of 1949 art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions] (stating that, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
apply to any territory occupied during international hostilities. They also apply in situations where the
occupation of the state territory meets with no armed resistance).
57 Charles Wyzanksi, Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? A Dangerous Precedent, THE ATi.ANIC (April
1946) (detailing the Tribunal's references to the Allied occupiers' responsibilities towards the German
people).
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of the UN Secretary General 5 characterized the Hague Regulations as reflecting
customary international law binding on all States.59
Occupation laws come into effect as soon as territory is "occupied"-that is,
when the government of the occupied territory is no longer capable of exercising
its authority, regardless of whether the occupation was initially deemed lawful. 6 0
Obligations and rights of the Occupying Power only extend to those areas their
forces actually control.6 1 Ultimately, whether territory is occupied is a question
of fact,6 2 but occupation does not imply an assumption of sovereignty; the Occu-
pying Power is simply administering the area it has captured. Various attributes
of sovereignty are often limited during occupations, however, as the Occupying
Power assumes most of the executive functions of the former government, as
well as some legislative and judicial responsibilities. 6 3 A "military government"
administers the occupied territory; it may, however, permit segments of the local
government to continue operating. In fact, a strong preference for allowing local
authorities to perform governmental functions is evident throughout the body of
occupation law.M
Despite being labeled "military government", the occupation government may
be military, civilian, or mixed in composition. 6 5 Regardless of their makeup, oc-
cupation law imposes significant policing/law and order responsibilities on occu-
pation forces, as it is primarily motivated by humanitarian considerations. 6 6
Occupation formally ends with the reestablishment of a legitimate government or
other form of administration (such as by the UN) capable of adequately and effi-
ciently administering the territory. 67
Occupation law clearly preserves, to the extent possible, the role of a defeated
population in governing their own country and facilitates the eventual transfer of
a nation's authority back to its own people.68 Duties of an Occupying Power are
primarily found in Articles 42-56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth
58 Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the
Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories U. N. Doc. A/RES/48/41 (December 10,
1993).
59 The declaration these regulations are customary law is important under international law because it
makes their standards and obligations binding on all nation-states, regardless of their membership or
party status to various treaties or other international agreements.
6 See Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, supra note 54.
61 Id.
62 Id. The fact some resistance continues does not preclude the existence of occupation, provided the
occupying force is capable of governing the territory to some degree. It is also not legally relevant if the
occupiers claim to be "liberating" the population-justification of the conflict has no bearing on which
laws apply.
63 Id.
6 See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Crimes of War: Law of the Belligerent Occupier, George C. Mar-
shall European Center for Security Studies, Germany (2003).
65 Id.
66 Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 95
CAL. L. REV. 6 (Dec. 2007).
67 Schmitt, supra note 64.
68 ICRC Report, supra note 55.
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Geneva Convention, Articles 27-34 and 47-78, as well as certain provisions of
Additional Protocol I and customary international law. 69 The main rules of occu-
pation law stress that the occupier's powers are not absolute and should be
viewed as limited in duration, lasting only long enough for the defeated nation to
re-establish its own form of government. 70 Most notably missing from the list of
occupier obligations are any guidelines or expectations on an Occupying Power
in regards to its day-to-day administering of the occupied territory. Where are the
requirements for establishing a new form of government? What criteria should be
used to select new national leaders? Should a new constitution be drafted? If so,
through what process? Under what circumstances is it permissible to continue
governing a nation, despite vehement local protest? Though elections are recog-
nized as a fundamental right, these questions, which get to the heart of what a
new nation will become post-occupation, are left to be determined on a case-by-
case basis, thus resting an inordinate amount of power on the occupier-rather
than the international community-to answer them as they see fit.
Since elections, as discussed above, are often the jumping-off point for both a
new government and a new way of governing, it is reasonable to examine various
approaches to their implementation in order to determine whether a model ap-
proach would aid future efforts. In an attempt to control some of the many vari-
ables, the case studies examined in this piece all involve occupations by the
United States and are all considered the most monumental occupations in the
modern era.7 ' As a Western democracy, the United States is quite familiar with
elections and the democratic process. The case studies were all true occupa-
69 Supra note 54.
70 See The 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 56; Geneva Conventions, supra note 56; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I [hereinafter Additional Proto-
col 1]; UN CHARTER (providing the following guidelines:
-The Occupying Power does not acquire sovereignty over the territory
-Occupation is only temporary
-The Occupying Power must respect the laws in force in the occupied territory, unless they constitute
a threat to security or an obstacle to international law
-The Occupying Power must take measures to restore and ensure public order and safety
-The Occupying Power must ensure sufficient hygiene and public health standards, as well as provi-
sion of food and medical care
-The population cannot be forced to enlist in the occupier's armed forces
-Forcible transfers of populations from and within the occupied territory are prohibited
-Transfers of the civilian population of the Occupying Power into the occupied territory are prohibited
-Collective punishment is prohibited
-Taking of hostages is prohibited
-Reprisals against protected persons or their property is prohibited
-The confiscation of private property is prohibited
-The destruction or seizure of public enemy property is prohibited, unless required by military
necessity
-Cultural property must be respected
-People accused of criminal offenses must be afforded internationally recognized due process
-Relief agencies (such as the ICRC) must be allowed to carry out humanitarian aid duties
71 See JAMEs DOBBINS, iT AL., America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, RAND
Corporation, 2003; see Marc Cogen & Eric de Brabandere, Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction", 20 Leiden J. Int'l L. 669, 669-93 (2007) (discussing free and fair elections in smaller
occupations-East Timor, Kosovo, and Afghanistan).
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tions,72 with the U.S. having almost carte-blanche to administer each of its terri-
tories, 73  thus-in theory-removing delays and other obstacles caused by
bureaucratic in-fighting, political posturing, group-think, and endless committee
discussions. Most importantly, the timing of elections, and the decision as to
whether national or local elections should come first, were altered in each case,
allowing for a unique opportunity to compare each approach. These two factors
are important components of the model framework set forth in Section IV.
III. A Tale of Three Occupations: Germany, Japan, and Iraq
Germany and Japan demonstrate how elections that start at the local level al-
low a new balance of social and political forces to emerge and coalesce. In 1945-
46, President Truman's approach to democratization was a bottom-up effort, be-
ginning with grassroots initiatives in small, local offices leading up to local, and
then regional, elections.7 4 In 2003-04, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
in Iraq, under the direction of Ambassador Paul Bremer, never held local elec-
tions and never allowed the Iraqis to hold them, either. Rather, President Bush
decided to implement national elections first, with the hopes of establishing a
governing body capable of taking over as the sovereign authority in Iraq before
the 2004 U.S. elections cycle.7 5 In the end, however, it would take three different
elections and various transitional bodies before Iraq finally had permanent lead-
ers at ANY level-a process that took more than two years.76
A. Germany, 1945: De-centralized, Local Control
The Potsdam Conference7 7 called for the establishment of local self-govern-
ment "on democratic principles and, in particular, through elective councils as
rapidly as possible and as is consistent with military security and the purpose of
military occupation", with later extensions of authority to regional and state ad-
ministrations. 78 Thus, the victorious Allied powers in Europe realized it was im-
portant to first implement democratic measures at smaller, local levels, before
72 Id.; 1907 Hague Regulation, supra note 56.
73 See EDWARD N, PETERSON, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION oF GERMANY: RETREAT TO VICTORY,
Wayne State University Press (1977); See EARL. F. ZIEMIiK, THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF
GERMANY, 1944-46, Center for Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC (1975). Initially,
the Allied Control Council was expected to play a larger role in regards to governing Germany; however,
the slow nature of collective governance became clear by mid-1945, and each victor-Britain, the U.S.,
France, and the Soviet Union-was left to govern its designated zone with little consultation with the
other members).
74 ZIEMKE, supra note 73.
75 See Diamond, supra note 9.
76 Id.; Phoebe Marr, A Modern History of Iraq (2011).
77 Reports of the Potsdam Conference, available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/
m-ustO0003-1224.pdf (The Potsdam Conference, held in the summer of 1945, was a meeting between
"The Big Three" victors of World War li-Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill (replaced on July 26 by Prime Minister Clement Attlee), and U.S. President Harry Truman-
in Potsdam, Germany, to negotiate terms for the end of World War II).
78 Id.
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attempting large-scale national elections.7 9 To accomplish this, civil affairs/mili-
tary government officers were stationed in every town and village throughout the
U.S. sector-oversight and control of the process would be easy due to sufficient
soldiers being on the ground and living within the communities.80
In early May 1945, the U.S. Army began to organize German provincial and
district governments, including identifying citizens to serve in government posi-
tions."' Finding men with no Nazi involvement for the higher posts proved to be
arduous business. Many of the potential candidates had not worked under the
Nazis due to age or political affiliation, or they had held much lower ranks. Some
were women, for whom the Nazi discrimination against their sex provided an
advantage during the occupation period.8 2
In addition to weeding out the Nazis, military government officers recruiting
Germans for appointments had to be careful to steer clear of over-involvement
with other political factions. General Eisenhower repeatedly reminded army com-
manders the purpose of military government authorities was not to actually gov-
ern, but to oversee the German governmental authorities-a fine and delicate
line.8 3 A network of U.S.-appointed local councils and a central advisory council
were eventually established as precursors to self-government. 84
When SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied European Forces) began to look
at German political activity in June 1945, it found none in the traditional sense of
the term.8 5 The vast majority of Germans were preoccupied with other things,
such as food, housing, and other problems related to survival. 8 6 Additionally, no
other party than the Nazi Party had existed legally, or even illegally, in any or-
ganized fashion since 1933.87 In August 1945, military detachments were permit-
ted to start licensing parties at the local level, but there was little to no interest
from the public.88 The detachments quickly realized German politics involved
much more than parties and rivalries: the German appointees represented social,
economic, and religious outlooks, in addition to political ones. Special interests,
such as the Catholic Church or individual cliques, were determining policy direc-
tion.89 Nevertheless, elections for small communities (less than 20,000 people)
were scheduled for January 1946, and elections for larger towns and cities would
79 DOBBINS Er AL, supra note 71, at 14.
80 ZIBMKE, supra note 73, at 272 (providing provides an extremely in-depth analysis of all aspects of
the Allied occupation in Germany, with care to provide data and sources for each assertion. It is a
compilation of three decades of work following the war).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Correlli Barnett, Post-conquest Civil Affairs: Comparing War's End in Iraq and Germany, The
Foreign Policy Centre, 4 (2005).
85 ZlEMKE, supra note 73, at 361-62.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 362-63.
89 Id.
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be held a few months later.90 The hope was active political life in Germany
would rebound by late 1946.91
The first parties on the scene were the Communists and the Social Democrats,
neither of which bore the Nazi taint, but both were opposed by the Church and
lacked a working class majority. 9 2 The two strongest pre-Nazi parties showing
signs of life were the Center Party and the Bavarian People's Party, so the U.S.
was relatively generous in appointing their members to administrative posts, de-
spite direct orders to avoid political favoritism. 9 3 Both the CP and the BPP let it
be known-to the annoyance of U.S. officials-they would welcome repentant
Nazis to their ranks. 9 4
Throughout the nation, there was a concern about lack of experience and lead-
ership within the new political parties. Except for a few survivors of the concen-
tration camps, there was not an abundance of men with political backgrounds. 95
Outside of the senior Allied staff, most military officers and German politicians
wanted the elections postponed; none of the parties who received licenses wanted
to risk their existence in a premature test of strength, and several of their mem-
bers already had jobs as appointees. 9 6 But General Lucius Clay97, the U.S. officer
placed in charge of military government, believed in learning by doing, so the
Germans were sent to the polls whether they were ready (and willing) or not.
Clay also realized that there soon would not be sufficient manpower to run the
country if they did not get Germans into positions, as large numbers of U.S.
officers were slated to return home in the latter half of 1945.98
9 Lest it seem this was a relatively easy feat, the challenges facing occupation officials should be
clear. The last years of the conflict severely damaged Germany's physical infrastructure. See, e.g. Tony
Killick, Principals, Agents, and the Failings of Conditionality, 9 J. ON INr'l.. Dizv. 483-95 (1997). A
huge refugee crisis loomed, the economy collapsed, and hunger haunted nearly everyone. Additionally,
nearly seven million Germans died during the war. See, e.g. Eva Bellin, The Iraqi Intervention and
Democracy in Comparative Historical Context, 119 PoLrcAL Sci. Q. 4 (2004-05). In most industrial
areas, more than half the houses were damaged, while nearly two-fifths were beyond were repair. The
transport system had been smashed by bombardment, with only 656 miles of rail track operable out of
nearly 8,000 miles. All seven rail bridges across the Rhine were destroyed and the canal system suffered
from similar damage. 1,500 road bridges were destroyed and there were desperate shortages of fuel and
civilian vehicles. Essential ports were encumbered by wrecks and other obstructions; the telecommunica-
tions net was reduced to chaos. Coal was in short supply, and it served as the energy source for electric
power, industry, and the remaining petrol plants. Millions of displaced persons had to be sheltered, fed,
sorted out, and eventually repatriated to other parts of Europe, not to mention the several million German
prisoners of war who needed to be disarmed and demobilized. See, e.g. Barnett, supra note 84, at 3.
91 DOBBINS ITr AL, supra note 71, at 15-16.
92 ZIEMKE, supra note 73, at 361-62.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 361-63.
95 Id. at 364-66.
96 Id.
97 General Clay, the U.S. viceroy in Germany, was an engineer by training and also an expert at
reconstruction. His military experience consisted of assignments with the Army Corps of Engineers dur-
ing the New Deal and as the Army's Chief of Materiel during World War II. He was able to use his
expertise to restore public utilities, clear roads, and move rations and supplies to prevent starvation and
disease. See, Barnett, supra note 84, at 13.
98 ZmMKE, supra note 73, at 364-66.
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Despite American misgivings and local disinterest, the Germans went to the
polls for local elections in January 1946 in astonishingly large numbers: 86% of
those eligible voted.99 General Clay and other military government officers found
this particularly gratifying, since it justified the assertion the new administration
was based on popular support. 0 0 But political principles were still obscure, since
the successful parties welcomed former Nazis and either had strong ties to the
Catholic Church or the Communist Party. The average German still did not rec-
ognize the personal responsibilities accompanying political freedom, but the time
for discussion was over.i0 In April and May 1946, the Germans voted for re-
gional councils, again with high turnouts. On June 14, 1946, detachments in the
U.S. zone rescinded all existing military government directives, officially ending
military government in Germany.102
The gradual implementation of self-governance allowed Germany's new polit-
ical parties to build momentum and enabled occupation officials to adapt their
procedures before larger-scale elections took place. By establishing local and re-
gional governments early-the first began within eight months of the German
surrender-the day-to-day running of the country became much smoother. Over
the next few years, the Allied governments gradually relaxed control over Ger-
man political life. A new German constitution would not be drafted until 1949,103
however, giving both occupation officials and the population ample time to de-
velop new economic, political, and social centers-in other words, allowing the
Germans to decide what they wanted their new country to be. This is contrasted
in Japan, as discussed below, where General MacArthur ordered national elec-
tions to be held within six months of surrender, though the close-held, grassroots
approach remained the same.'os
Beginning in February 1948, the three western occupying powers of Germany
(the U.S., Britain, and France) began debating the political future of their respec-
tive zones. In June of that year, negotiations were concluded, leading to the de-
velopment of a democratic and federal West German state.' 0 5 The presiding
ministers of Germany's regional states were directed to arrange a constitutional
assembly to draft a constitution for the new state. According to papers known as
the Frankfurt Documents,' 0 6 the constitution was to specify a central government
99 Id. at 427-428 (Before the elections, military government detachments reviewed the 4,750,000
names on the voting lists and disqualified 326,000 for Nazi affiliations).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (May 23, 1949), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
4e64d9a02.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
104 Jiaip BRIDOUx, AMERICAN FOREIGN PoICY AND POST-WAR REcoNsTRucION: COMPARING JAPAN
AND IRAQ. (Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2011).
105 DONALD P KoMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL. REPLuic O GER-
MANY 309 (Duke University Press, 2012).
106 Participants at the Potsdam Conference had agreed that the foreign ministers of the four victorious
powers should meet to implement and monitor the conference's decisions about postwar Europe. During
their fifth meeting, held in London in late 1947, prospects for concluding a peace treaty with Germany
were examined. Following lengthy discussions on the question of reparations, the conference ended with-
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while simultaneously respecting the various regional administrations, and would
contain provisions and guarantees of individual freedoms and rights. 07 The min-
isters were reluctant to begin this work, however, since they felt the creation of a
West Germany state would mean a permanent separation from the eastern zone.
On their own accord, they decided to implement the requirements of the Frank-
furt Documents on a provisional basis.' 0 8 They held a parliamentary council
rather than a constitutional assembly, and the resulting document was referred to
as a "basic law", not a constitution.1 0 9 Thus, it was clear West Germany would
not be the only state of German people-reunification and self-determination
remained on the agenda. The Western Allied powers acquiesced to this
approach. 0
Delegates to the parliamentary council were appointed by the leaders of West
Germany's regional states.11 1 A preliminary draft of the "Basic Law" was pre-
pared in August 1948, and final editing started on September 1. At this time, a
larger, 65-member council was formed, with members being elected by the re-
gional parliaments of their respective states.1' 2 The final draft of the Basic Law
was passed by the council on May 8, 1949 and approved by the Western Allied
powers a mere four days later.' 13 The ratification process was quick, and on May
23, 1949, the German Basic Law was signed and promulgated." 4 It was followed
by the first nation-wide elections in West Germany."t 5
Prior to 1945, Germany's experience with true democracy was close to non-
existent." 6 By the end of the war, its infrastructure was destroyed, it faced a
massive humanitarian crisis, it was burdened with extensive war reparations, and
its people were near exhaustion."'7 When the Allied occupation began, the major-
ity military government opinion favored an extended period of tutelage." 8 If this
out any concrete decisions. The tense atmosphere during the talks and the uncooperative attitude of the
Soviet participants convinced the Western Allies of the necessity of a common political order for the
three Western zones. At the request of France, the Western Allies were joined by Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Luxembourg at the subsequent Six Power Conference in London, which met in two sessions in
the spring of 1948. The recommendations of this conference were contained in the so-called Frankfurt
Documents, which the military governors of the Western zones issued to German political leaders on July
1, 1948. The documents called for convening a national convention to draft a constitution for a German
state formed from the Western occupation zones. The documents also contained the announcement of an
Occupation Statute, which was to define the position of the occupation powers within the new state.
107 Kommers, supra note 105, at 309.
108 Id.
10 Id.
110 Id.
11t JUSTIN COLLINGs, DEMOCRACY'S GUARDIAN: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL. CONSTrrU-
TIONAL COURT 287 (Oxford University Press 2015).
112 Id.
113 COLLINGS, supra note 111.
114 Id.
115 EDWARD NORMAN PETFERSON, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF GERMANY: RFTREAT TO VICrORY
(Wayne State University Press 1977).
116 BRIDOUX, supra note 104, at 9.
117 Id.
118 DOBBINS 1Hr AL, supra note 71, at 14.
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view had prevailed, the result might have been the same as the protracted and
increasingly expensive train of denazification programs the Allies attempted to
implement but ultimately backed away from (and, it should be noted, eventually
handed off to the Germans to run, with great success).1 19 General Clay made
democracy as attainable an objective for U.S. forces as it was ever going to be by
placing responsibility for its attainment where it would ultimately have to lay:
with the German people.1 20 By not attempting to undertake an extensive democ-
ratization program, the military government actually accomplished more.121 60
years later, the opposite approach was adopted in Iraq, with widespread civil
education programs and "democracy talks" being attempted but no effort to actu-
ally engage citizens in the practice of democracy.1 2 2
In 1945, few people believed the German nation would recover from the
war.1 2 3 The winners of Germany's first post-conflict elections were Communists
and Catholics-two groups loathed in American politics at the time.1 2 4 But their
victories sent a swift message to other constituencies: get it together or get out.
By the time national elections arrived, many more "desirable" groups had made
headway.1 25 Within five years, the German people were in control of their coun-
try through a new democratic government, and Germany gradually transitioned
from a former enemy into a strong potential ally in the Cold War.1 26
119 Although denazification was one of the principal objectives of the early occupation period, its
proposed scale quickly proved impractical. The occupying powers did not have the manpower or re-
sources to accomplish such a thorough purging of German society, and the U.S. forces found it impossi-
ble to administer the state without interacting with and utilizing competent bureaucrats and officials, at
least some of whom were complicit in the Nazi regime. See, Peterson, supra note 115, at 4; numerous
detachments quickly protested that, under the rules, they could not find enough people to begin reorga-
nizing the German administration. See ZHEMKE, supra note 73, at 382. By December 1945, it was clear
the status quo could not continue. Before the end of the year, Clay said it was time for the German people
to take charge of denazification. See ZI1BMKE, supra note 73, at 429; from the beginning, the Germans
approached denazification differently than the Americans. While the Allies only distinguished between
active and nominal Nazis, the Germans recognized several levels of gradation, settling on five: major
offenders, offenders, lesser offenders, followers, and exonerated, and adopted a scale of sanctions based
on the offense, thus allowing for options other than permanent exclusion. The Germans meant to remove
the Nazi stigma from the individual and reinstate him to a position within society. See ZIEMKE, supra
note 73, at 400; By June of 1946, 90% of the Germans initially purged were rehabilitated. As the standard
of living then rapidly improved throughout the sector, there was accelerated progress toward political
goals. See RAY SALVATORE JENNINGS, 'The Road Ahead: Lesson in Nation-Building from Japan, Ger-
many, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq, "Peaceworks No 49. United States Institute for Peace, Washing-
ton, DC (April 2003).
120 ZlEMKE, supra note 73, at 445.
121 Id.
122 See discussions of "democracy dialogues" in the works of Bremer, Diamond, and Van Buren, each
of whom discusses thousands of civic education lessons provided in Iraq with no follow-through for
actual democratic practices.
123 Bellin, supra note 90, at 606-07.
124 Z1MKE, supra note 73, at 363.
125 Id.
126 Barnett, supra note 84, at 15-16.
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B. Japan, 1945: Decentralized, National Control
Immediately after the Japanese announced their decision to surrender in Au-
gust 1945, General Douglas MacArthur was appointed the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to oversee the occupation of Japan. Although he
was technically under the authority of an Allied Powers commission, MacArthur
took his orders from Washington.1 27 Rather than establish an American military
government to rule Japan during the occupation, as was done in Germany, Mac-
Arthur decided to employ the existing Japanese government. 128 This decision
was based largely on two factors: 1) there was nothing similar to the "Nazi litmus
test" to determine who should be purged from the new government; and 2) the
U.S. military was severely lacking in Japanese language and technical experts.1 29
Also, MacArthur realized imposing a new order on the island nation would be a
difficult task, even with Japanese cooperation. It would be impossible, he be-
lieved, for foreigners to dictate radical changes on 80 million resentful people.13 0
Thus, MacArthur's regime functioned by issuing direct orders to Japanese gov-
ernment officials and allowing them to manage the country.' 3 '
An important element of MacArthur's democratization strategy was to work
locally among outlying communities, completely bypassing the conservative top
and middle layers of the Japanese government.1 32 Local elections were held in
which women were permitted to vote for the first time, and roving teams of
civics instructors were dispatched to cities and towns to discuss the nature of
democracy. 3 3 Civil affairs officers, pulled from the military and civilian defense
agencies, followed these teams and organized communities to begin reconstruc-
tion projects of local choosing. It was democracy in miniature and it helped com-
munities address their real needs while developing an appreciation for political
participation that proved useful after the return of sovereignty.1 3 4 As democratic
government emerged in Japan, direct-involvement programs such as these en-
127 In Japan, the United States took the lead in the occupation because it played the predominant role
in the final phases of the Pacific war. Unlike Germany, there would be no zones and no division of
responsibility. The Potsdam Conference did not limit the actions the U.S. could take in carrying out the
occupation, so they hoped to avoid the most troublesome aspects of the German occupation, where policy
formulation and implementation was slowed and sometimes blocked by the need to forge agreements
among the four parties. See DOBBINS ET AL,, supra note 71, at 28-29; 31.
128 DOBBINS ET AL, supra note 71, at 53; BRIDOUX, supra note 104; Bellin, supra note 90, at 600.
129 Id.
130 DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REPORTS OF DOUGLAS MACARTHUR (U.S. Government Print Office,
1966).
131 JENNINGS, supra note 119, at 9-10. Once the occupation was underway, MacArthur sent troops and
civil affairs officers on rounds of motorcycle diplomacy throughout the country to establish security and
explain U.S. intentions while managing local expectations of the military government; DOBBINS H[ Al,
supra note 71, at 32. In August 1945, MacArthur instructed the Japanese government to establish a
liaison office to interact with SCAP headquarters. The Central Liaison Office was located in Tokyo and
staffed by the Foreign Ministry. Liaison offices were also set up in each prefecture to serve local military
government teams. The Central Liaison Office functioned as the primary channel for communication
between the SCAP special staff sections and the Japanese government.
132 JENNINGS, supra note 119, at 28.
'33 Id.
'34 Id.
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couraged a critical mass of citizens to take part in elections and to engage in
political discourse while making demands and articulating interests to their new
leaders. 135
The wording of the Potsdam Declarationl 36 and the initial post-surrender mea-
sures1 3 7 indicated neither MacArthur nor his superiors intended to impose a new
political system on Japan unilaterally; rather, they hoped to encourage Japan's
new leaders to initiate democratic reforms on their own.1 38 MacArthur an-
nounced a national election would be held in April 1946, only seven months
following the surrender. 1 3 9 He also called for the Japanese Diet1 4 0 to pass a new
election law to provide for free democratic elections, including the right of wo-
men to vote.141 But by early 1946, MacArthur's staff and Japanese officials were
at odds over the most fundamental issue: the writing of a new constitution.1 4 2
The Japanese were extremely reluctant to replace the Meiji Constitution of
1889,143 while the Americans desired a far more liberal document. 144 The Meiji
Constitution concentrated actual political power in the hands of a small group of
135 Id.
136 See Potsdam Conference, supra note 78.
137 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 423-427 (Sept. 23, 1945).This document
set two main objectives for the occupation: 1) To insure that Japan would not again become a menace to
the United States or to the peace and security of the world. 2) To bring about the eventual establishment
of a peaceful and responsible government which would respect the rights of other states and would
support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations. The document also set four main policies to be pursued: Japanese sovereignty would
include only the four main Japanese islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku, while the fate
of additional islands was to be determined later (this provision was taken from the Potsdam Declaration
of July 26, 1945); Japan was to be disarmed, and the military was not to play any important role in
Japanese society in the future; Japanese society was to be encouraged to develop personal liberties, such
as freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press, as well as to develop democratically elected
institutions; the Japanese economy was to be developed for peaceful purposes.
138 JENNINGS, supra note 119, at 16.
139 DOBBINS UT Al., supra note 71, at 44; JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE
OF WORLD WAR II (W.W. Norton and Company, 1999).
140 The National Diet is Japan's bicameral legislature. It is composed of a lower house called the
Hou§e of Representatives, and an upper house, called the House of Councilors. Both houses of the Diet
are directly elected under parallel voting systems. In addition to passing laws, the Diet is formally re-
sponsible for selecting the Prime Minister. The Diet was first convened as the Imperial Diet in 1889 as a
result of adopting the Meiji Constitution. The Diet took its current form in 1947 upon the adoption of the
post-war constitution and is considered by the Constitution to be the highest organ of state power. See
"Diet Functions", www.shugiin.go.jp
141 JENNINGS, supra note 119, at 28.
142 BRIDOUX, supra note 104, at 129, 134-36.
143 See Meiji Constitution, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Aug. 3, 2011), https://www.britannica.com/
topic/Meiji-Constitution. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan's leaders sought to create a constitu-
tion that would define Japan as a capable, modern nation deserving of Western respect while preserving
their own power. The resultant document called for a bicameral parliament (the Diet) with an elected
lower house and a prime minister and cabinet appointed by the emperor. The emperor was granted
supreme control of the army and navy. A privy council advised the emperor and wielded actual power.
Voting restrictions, which limited the electorate to about 5 percent of the adult male population, were
loosened over the next 25 years, resulting in universal male suffrage. Political parties made the most of
their limited power in the 1920s, but in the 1930s the military was able to exert control without violating
the constitution.
144 DOWER, supra note 139, at 4, 374-75, 383-84.
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government leaders responsible to the emperor, not the people.1 45 From 1930 to
the end of the war, this governing group was dominated by the military.1 46
MacArthur desired a constitution in which power was vested in the people, not
held by an elite few and only permitted to flow down to the population. 147 He
communicated this view to the leaders of the Japanese government, who formed
a committee to rewrite the Meiji Constitution.1 4 8 A group of Japanese constitu-
tional scholars began meeting in late 1945, but their recommendations were too
conservative for U.S. officials-after four months of work, the committee had
produced a revision with only minor word changes.14 9 This version was rejected
outright by U.S. officials.' 5 0 In the end, it fell to the Americans to draft a new
national charter for Japan. On February 3, 1946, MacArthur directed the govern-
ment section of SCAP (Supreme Command - Allied Powers) to draft a constitu-
tion to guide the Japanese cabinet in its efforts. This "model constitution" would
then be used by the Japanese in preparing another revision.1 5 1 He urged extreme
haste and secrecy because he wanted to go public with a Japanese-endorsed draft
before the newly-established Far East Commission, an internal advisory board
given jurisdiction over constitutional matters, convened in late February.1 5 2 Also,
the scheduled national election was barely two months away, and MacArthur saw
this election as a test to whether the Japanese people would accept democratic
changes in their political system. 153
The job of writing MacArthur's "model constitution" fell to a team of about a
dozen Army and Navy officers, all with special training in government affairs,
plus a few civilian experts.1 5 4 The team met secretly, using a 1939 edition of a
book on world constitutions as their main reference.' 5 5 This initial drafting con-
vention lasted six days, and SCAP completed the entire document within two
weeks.1 5 6 It was presented to Japanese officials on February 19, 1946.157 Much
of the document was prepared by two senior army officers with law degrees,
although other MacArthur appointees had significant influence, especially in re-
gards to women's rights.' 5 8 Though the document's drafters were not Japanese,
145 See Meiji Constitution, supra note 143.
146 Id.
147 DOWER, supra note 139, at 4; DOBBINS ET AL, supra note 71, at 43.
148 Id.
149 Id. For example, the emperor became a "supreme" authority, rather than "sacred".
150 Id.
151 Id.
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153 Id.
154 Id.
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156 Id. The length of time devoted to drafting a national constitutional seems to have no correlation to
its success. For example, the Constitution of the United States was written in approximately 100 hours,
but, as will be discussed below, even a temporary constitution in Iraq took more than four months.
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the Meiji Constitution, demands of Japanese lawyers, opinions of pacifist politi-
cal leaders, and the earlier Japanese drafts were all taken into account within the
model constitution;' 5 9 nonetheless, Japanese government leaders were shocked
by the radical changes proposed in the "MacArthur Constitution".1 6 0 The result-
ing document borrowed from the British system in establishing a cabinet and
prime minister who were responsible to the National Diet. The guarantees of
individual rights included wording similar to that found in the American Bill of
Rights. One part, pertaining to equal rights for all citizens, even went beyond the
legal protections Americans enjoyed at the time.161 But the Japanese found it
hard to accept the idea of "rule by the people", which conflicted with the Japa-
nese tradition of absolute obedience to the emperor.1 6 2 After disagreeing among
themselves, the Japanese cabinet went to the emperor, who ended the deadlock
by commanding the model become the basis for the new constitution of Japan.1 63
On March 6, 1946, the Japanese cabinet accepted the constitution and an out-
line of the document was presented to the Japanese public, followed by state-
ments of approval by Emperor Hirohito and General MacArthur.1 64 The
population eventually accepted this hastily written and poorly translated docu-
ment,1 65 as did the Far East Commission after suggesting minor revisions.1 66
Elections for national representatives occurred on April 10, 1946,167 with the
resulting body responsible for approving the constitution. The MacArthur draft,
which proposed a unicameral legislature, was changed to allow a bicameral one,
with both houses being elected.' 6 8 In most other respects, the new government
adopted the U.S. version in its entirety, including the symbolic nature of the
emperor, guarantees of civil and human rights, and the renunciation of war.1 69
The Liberal Party was the biggest victor in the national elections, winning 148
of 464 seats in the Diet, with the Progressive and Socialist parties also having
strong showings at 110 and 96 seats, respectively. 170 Voter turnout was 72.1%,17
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 DOWER, supra note 139, at 33, 39; Y. Funabashi, China's Long-term Strategy: Peaceful Ascen-
dancy, IN'L. HERALD TRIBUNE (Dec. 30, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/30/opinion/asias-fu
ture-china-is-preparing-a-peaceful-ascendancy.html.
163 JENNINGS, supra note 119, at 16.
16 DOBBINS ET AL, supra note 71, at 44; DowER, supra note 139, at 4.
165 See JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, ExPORrING DEMOCRACY: FuiiulING AMERICA's DEsTINY, (Aei Press,
1991). The Americans insisted the constitution be translated into Japanese literally, rather than idiomati-
cally, because they feared that otherwise the translation could subvert its meaning. As a result, Japan's
constitution reads poorly in its own language.
166 DonINs Pr Al., supra note 71, at 44; DOWER, supra note 139, at 4.
167 Id. Under the new election laws, this was the first general election in Japan in which women were
permitted to vote. 39 women were elected to national office, a number that would stand as the largest in
Japan's history until 2005.
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allowing U.S. officials to assert the validity of the elections, the same way they
had in Germany. The three major parties that emerged from the election were
loosely based around the major parties from the 1937 election, prior to the
war. 17 2 Liberals and Progressives initially agreed to form a government under
Liberal leader Ichiro Hatoyama, who would assume the position of Prime Minis-
ter; however, Hatoyama was promptly purged by U.S. officials for being a milita-
rist, 7 3 so the new government was formed under Shigeru Yoshida, who became
Prime Minister on May 22, 1946.'74 When the Diet met during the summer of
1946, the newly elected legislators voted a final approval of Japan's new demo-
cratic constitution, which became effective on May 3, 1947.175
The Japanese constitution would not have been written the way it was had
MacArthur and his staff allowed Japanese politicians and constitutional experts
to resolve the issues as they wished.1 7 6 In late 1945 and early 1946, there was
much public discussion on constitutional reform, and the MacArthur draft was
apparently greatly influenced by the ideas of certain Japanese liberals.1 7 7 The
constitution's U.S. origins were deliberately kept quiet, but the awkward phras-
ing of the document made the secret hard to maintain.17 8 Revision became a topic
of fierce debate almost immediately, but many embraced the new constitution
despite its foreign roots. 179
Like Germany, Japan in 1945 was a country on the brink: it had suffered the
destruction of two atomic bombs and the fire-bombing of its major cities,' 0 its
people were on the brink of starvation,' 8 1 and its military had resorted to kami-
kaze tactics. 182 At the time of Japan's occupation, U.S. forces faced a regimented
people and strong, conservative elites, but they were able to rally the population
behind a common national cause-building a new democratic government.1 83 In
1949, MacArthur made a sweeping change in the SCAP power structure 8 4 that
172 Id.
173 Following the elections, successful Diet members were vetted by U.S. officials, as there had not
been time to conduct investigations on every candidate prior to the election. It was discovered Hatoyama
had committed numerous "militant acts" during the war.
174 DIETER ET AL., supra note 170, at 390.
175 Id.
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177 John W. Dower, Don't Expect Democracy This Time: Japan and Iraq, HISTORY & Poicy (Apr. 1,
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greatly increased the power of the Japanese government, and the occupation be-
gan to draw to a close. The Treaty of San Francisco,1 85 which was to end the
occupation, was signed on September 8, 1951; it came into effect on April 28,
1952, formally ending all occupation powers of the Allied forces and restoring
full sovereignty to Japan. 1 8 6 Less than seven years after being an aggressor in the
most destructive war the world had ever seen, the Japanese were again an inde-
pendent people free to run their country as they wished. Since then, the Japanese
have changed or done away with a number of the reforms instituted by MacAr-
thur, but one reform remains firmly in place: the MacArthur Constitution.1 8 7 In
70 years, the document has never been amended.18 8
C. Iraq, 2003: Centralized National Control
The 2003 occupation of Iraq began with the assumption an interim govern-
ment made up largely of exiled opposition leaders' 89 would quickly begin run-
ning the country. This assumption proved incorrect. When Ambassador Paul
Bremer was named as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in May
2003,190 he announced the U.S. would seek a UN resolution confirming
America's status as an occupying powerl91 and informed the exile opposition
185 The Treaty of San Francisco, or more commonly known as the Treaty of Peace with Japan, was
officially signed by 48 nations on September 8, 1951, in San Francisco, CA. It came into force on April
28, 1952 and officially ended the occupation of Japan. According to Article II of the Treaty, Japan
accepted the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War
Crimes Courts imposed on Japan both within and outside the country. The treaty served to officially end
Japan's position as an imperial power, to allocate compensation to Allied civilians and former prisoners
of war who had suffered Japanese war crimes during World War II, and to return sovereignty to the
Japanese government. See Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 11, signed Sep 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136
U.N.T.S. 45, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-1-1832-English
.pdf.
186 This was true for the main islands of Japan; the United States continued to hold the chains of Iwo
Jima and Okinawa until 1968 and 1972, respectively.
187 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 71, at 44; DowER, supra note 139, at 4.
188 Id.
189 The U.S. assumption was underlying bureaucratic and military structures in Iraq would be left
intact to govern the country while the top political leadership would be replaced by the exiled opposition
to Saddam. The hard core of this exile group had operated outside Baghdad's control in the 1990s and
was designated to receive support under the U.S.'s Iraq Liberation Act of 1998-a Congressional state-
ment that "It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by
Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq." The group consisted of a mix of Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds, but a
gathering of this opposition in London in mid-December 2002 gave an indication of future problems. The
Kurds wanted federalism with a high degree of separatism opposed by most others. Most objected to the
leadership of Ahmad Chalabi, the apparent U.S. front-runner for Iraq's leadership who had strong ties to
the CIA. Secularists had reservations about others' Islamist agendas, and the United States had concerns
about one group's ties to Iran. Marr, supra note 76, at 260.
190 THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ (2006) (this book also
reviews the precursor to the CPA, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),
established under retired General Jay Garner. The intent of the ORHA was to oversee response to an
expected humanitarian crisis in Iraq. When the crisis never arose and governance became an issue within
a few weeks, it was replaced with the CPA).
191 This was accomplished with UN Resolution 1453, which authorized the United States to exercise
legal power in Iraq, as well as to spend any Iraqi funds. The resolution made no mention of creating
democratic institutions based on free and fair elections, nor was this codified in the early CPA regula-
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parties and other local leaders the idea of an interim government with real sover-
eign authority had been indefinitely postponed.1 9 2
A key element in establishing a counter-insurgency (COIN) effort is establish-
ing a local government that can stand on its own so the people believe in their
leaders. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, General David Petraeus" 93 best-selling
doctrine1 94 for COIN operations argues, "The primary objective of any counter-
insurgency is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate
government."I 9 5 In contrast, the main critique in regards to the electoral process
in Iraq concerned its timetable and the lack of involvement of local actors. While
most experts agree a stable security environment is a highly desirable factor
before holding elections, the various interim or transitional institutions put in
place in Iraq caused great distrust among the population.1 96
Inside the CPA, there was widespread agreement Iraq would not be ready for
national elections anytime soon. Analysts felt time was needed to allow more
moderate, secular, and democratic parties in Iraq to develop their identities and
support.1 97 It was believed many months were needed before an Iraqi electoral
commission could be appointed and organized to register voters and certify the
eligibility of parties and candidates.1 98 This was not merely a political judgment;
the concern was that for elections to be fair, a level playing field must be estab-
lished for the competing parties.1 99 External experts advised against starting elec-
tions on a large scale, as holding national elections too early can strengthen
extremist and rejectionist forces, 200 but Bremer and his top governance staff de-
liberately resisted calls, and even vetoed plans, for direct elections for some local
and provincial councils. 2 0 ' Had a major effort been launched in early summer
2003, elections for a constitutional assembly could have been held by the spring
tions. The first reference to elections was not made until Security Council Resolution 1546, the same
resolution that formerly recognized the new, interim government of Iraq in June 2004. This resolution
welcomed the efforts of the interim government to work towards democratic elections. S.C. Res.1546,
U.N.Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004), http://unscr.com/files/2004/01546.pdf.
192 Ricks, supra note 190, at 165 (this decision inarguably contributed to the confusion and frustration
the Iraqis were already experiencing, as they had been told by Gen Garner, head of the earlier ORHA,
that the U.S. would hand over control within a few weeks).
193 Despite later falling from grace during his tenure as Director of the FBI, General Petraeus is still
considered the most successful battalion commander of the Iraq war. While in charge of the 101st Air-
borne Division, his strategies and tactics of working with local leaders and living among the citizens
would later become the foundation of the Army's new counter-insurgency manual, which was largely
authored by Petraeus. He later returned to Iraq, in 2007, as commander of the entire multi-national force.
194 At one time, FM 3-24 was one of the Top 20 books on both Amazon and Google Books. U.S.
Dep't of Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counter-Insurgency (2000) [hereinafter FM 3-24], https://www.hsdl
.org/?view&did=468442.
195 FM 3-24, supra note 194.
196 See, e. g., L. Diamond, Building Democracy After Conflict: Lessons from Iraq, (2005) 16 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 9.
197 Diamond, supra note 9, at 72.
198 Id at 79.
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of 2004 using the existing provinces as multi-member districts, or foregoing dis-
tricts altogether. 2 0 2 However, the CPA feared early elections would give advan-
tage to radical Islamic forces, which were better organized, initially, than their
more moderate or liberal opponents. 203 While this fear had some basis-87% of
Iraqis wanted religious groups to share power in government and 56% wanted
religious leaders to play a role in politics204-it also ignored the wishes of the
people. Most Iraqis overwhelmingly endorsed basic democratic principles such
as free and fair elections, free speech, even equal rights for women, and most
possessed a keen desire to elect the members of any constitutional-drafting
body. 205
The CPA's refusal to consider early elections raised concerns among many
observers, including the United Nations. 2 06 In July 2003, UN envoys proposed
beginning a voter registration drive, but the issue was a non-starter for Bremer.
He reiterated there were no voter rolls, no election law, no law on political par-
ties, and no electoral districts.2 0 7 He also argued electing a government without a
permanent constitution "invites confusion and eventual abuse". 2 08
During the summer of 2003, coalition military commanders were ordered to
halt elections in towns and cities across Iraq, as the CPA preferred to use a sys-
tem of consultation, indirect elections, and appointments to choose local mayors
and councils. 2 0 9 At the national level, a seven member Leadership Council had
been appointed prior to Bremer's arrival in Iraq.2 10 This council was comprised
of the heads of key exile parties who had not lived in the country for decades,2 1 1
and Bremer desired a broader base with more diversity (the exiles on the Council
were all Shia Muslims). 2 1 2 He spent more than two months attempting to locate
suitable candidates, but most Iraqis were resistant to participating in an appointed
government that delayed direct elections. 2 13 Eventually, Bremer and his staff an-
nounced a 25-member Interim Governing Council still dominated by exiled poli-
ticians.2 14 Bremer insisted the Council be perfectly representative of the
202 Id. at 48.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id at 46-47.
207 This issue, however, raises a question: if Bremer was the ultimate authority in the country, why did
he not initiate steps to create these things?
208 Diamond, supra note 9, at 46-47.
209 Van Buren, supra note 10, at 57.
210 Before being relieved of authority, Jay Garner, head of the short-lived ORHA-had appointed a
seven-member Leadership Council comprised of the heads of the key exile parties behind the Baghdad
Conference. Diamond, supra note 9, at 40-41; Marr, supra note 76, at 271-72.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
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population, with the result being 18 members who were so obscure 2/3 of Iraqis
could not offer an opinion on them. 215
The Governing Council quickly became a source of frustration, as it was a
completely ineffectual body.216 Bremer repeatedly appealed to the Council to
develop a timetable for drafting a constitution and electing a permanent govern-
ment, while the Council insisted power be handed over to them immediately. 2 17
With no timeline for direct elections, the Council was never held accountable,
and it was easy for them to blame Iraq's problems on the CPA. Polls continued to
show most of Iraqis believed their country was controlled by Bremer (which, to a
great extent, it was), and Council members spent most of their time lobbying
each other and the Americans for positions in the new government.218 Failure to
agree on a Council leader resulted in a "rotating presidency" that changed each
month. 219 Eventually, in September 2003, an impatient Secretary of State Colin
Powell set a six-month deadline for the Iraqis to draft a new constitution, but by
then the Council had been denounced by the population as a puppet of the Ameri-
can occupation. 220
Following Secretary Powell's edict, Bremer published an op ed in the Wash-
ington Post, laying out a lengthy, seven-step roadmap to end the occupation. 2 2 1
First, a constitution would be written and ratified, followed by a national elec-
tion. 2 2 2 This was opposite the approach taken by the U.S. in Germany and Japan,
where elections were held to determine who had the authority to approve the new
constitutions on behalf of the people. Neither U.S. officials, CPA staffers, nor
Iraqis supported Bremer's plan.2 2 3 The Bush administration wanted to transfer
authority before the 2004 elections, 224 and most coalition aids-namely, the Brit-
ish-worried Bremer's plan was too slow and cumbersome. 225 Important relig-
ious and political leaders in Iraq declared it unacceptable to have the constitution
prepared by unelected actors. 226 In November 2003, President Bush abruptly an-
nounced the occupation would end in June 2004, overruling Bremer's original
plan.227 Bremer then revealed a new series of steps later that month in which he
215 Diamond, supra note 9, at 48.
216 Id. at 26, 43; Marr, supra note 76, at 272-73.
217 Diamond, supra note 9, at 49-50.
218 Id. at 26, 43; Marr, supra note 76, at 272-73.
219 Diamond, supra note 9, at 49-50.
220 Id. at 26; Marr, supra note 76, at 272-73.
221 UN Resolution 1511 mandated the United States to present a plan by December 2003 for transi-
tioning to an Iraqi government.
222 RICKS, supra note 190, at 254; Marr, supra note 76, at 279.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.; Diamond, supra note 9, at 25.
226 RICKS, supra note 190, at 254; see also Diamond, supra note 9 (discussion of Shia Sheik al-
Sistani, one of the most influential actors in Iraq, and not a member of the Governing Council. At one
point, Sistani even issued afatwa-a religious decree binding on the faithful-forbidding any followers
from participating in a non-elected government).
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abandoned the goal of drafting a constitution or holding a national election before
the turnover; instead, the U.S. would transfer power to a temporary body.22 8 The
new plan proposed a national assembly to be chosen through a series of complex
local caucuses, which would then select the interim government. 229 This interim
body would be responsible for conducting a national election for a constituent
assembly by March 2005. The constituent assembly's sole responsibility would
be to draft a constitution and hold a referendum on it.230 If successful, a second
election would be held in December 2005 for a new national assembly, which
would become Iraq's new constitutional government. 2 3 1 To govern the country in
the meantime, the CPA and Governing Council were to work together to draw up
a transitional administrative law (TAL). 2 3 2
This plan also would not survive. The Governing Council resented having it
imposed on them and most Iraqis opposed the complicated system of caucuses
and the idea of an unelected, interim government. 23 3 Barely two weeks after it
was announced, Bremer's second attempt to build a government was in serious
trouble, and the CPA had less than two months to draft the TAL and get it
adopted so they could begin work on the caucuses that would elect the transi-
tional assembly. Many within the CPA did not understand how the caucus system
was supposed to work, and most Iraqis felt the local and provincial councils
would simply bow to American will because they were appointed by the CPA. 2 3 4
The United States was repeatedly finding itself on the less democratic side of
arguments: Iraqi leaders called for an elected constitution-making body, Bremer
said an appointed body would do; Iraqis wanted direct elections for local govern-
ment, Bremer and other top officials vetoed them; Iraqis desired direct, transpar-
ent elections, the CPA proposed an opaque and convoluted process. 235
Ultimately, the UN intervened with a compromise: the caucuses would be
scrapped and the interim government chosen by June 30, 2004. A transitional
assembly would then be directly elected by December. 2 3 6 But the question re-
mained as to how the interim government would be selected, and it would not be
answered until the TAL was approved.
A preliminary draft of the TAL emphasized civil rights, a central government
with an independent judiciary, and separation of powers. 2 3 7 Shia groups quickly
demanded (and ultimately received) a provision forbidding the passage during
the interim period of "any law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of
228 Marr, supra note 76, at 258; Diamond, supra note 9, at 51.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. This plan postponed the drafting of the constitution for another 15 months and delayed the
direct election of a new government for nearly two more years.
232 Marr, supra note 76, at 279; Diamond, supra note 9, at 51.
233 Diamond, supra note 9, at 76-81.
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235 Id. at 128, 198, 201-02.
236 Id. at 83, 137-38; Marr, supra note 76, at 282.
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Islam". 238 Another provision of the TAL mandated the law "aim to achieve" at
least one-quarter of the national assembly seats be awarded to women. 239 Staffers
believed it possible to craft electoral rules to ensure this goal. 2 4 0 During one
contentious meeting between the CPA and the Governing Council involving a
debate on family law issues, the majority voted to repeal a reference to shari'a
law 2 4 1 that had been previously approved. 242 A delegate from the one of the
largest Shia parties walked out, claiming the majority was attempting to force
things on the Council members and accused the CPA of not operating by consen-
sus. Eight other Council members followed. 243 The deadline came and went
without approval of the TAL. 2 44 During another marathon meeting, the Sunni
delegation threatened to walk out, as well, when it became clear the CPA was
negotiating with the Kurds for the possibility of a Kurdistan Regional Govern-
ment.2 4 5 Last-minute negotiations resulted in a document no party was satisfied
with, and the Shia delegation refused to attend the much-publicized signing cere-
mony. The CPA, suffering one of its most embarrassing moments, cancelled the
ceremony and renewed negotiations. The document was signed five days later. 2 4 6
Immediately following the TAL signing ceremony, 12 members of the Gov-
erning Council issued a statement proclaiming their intention to "amend" certain
provisions of the TAL they felt were undemocratic. There was no legal mecha-
nism for them to do so, but the speaker stated they would seek to make changes
before the June 30 transfer of power.2 4 7 These same Council members warned
the TAL would lack legitimacy until it was approved by a democratically-elected
national assembly (which was not part of the CPA's planned agenda.) 248
The TAL received mixed reviews. Some argued the Governing Council did
not have the authority to adopt even an interim constitution. 249 People repeatedly
asked why the document had not been submitted for consideration by civil soci-
ety organizations, political parties, religious leaders, and the general public. 2 5 0
CPA staffers suggested Iraqis focus on the future constitution, since the TAL was
238 Language was also added forbidding laws contradicting democracy or fundamental human rights,
but the TAL did not address the question of what would happen if there was a disagreement between the
two provisions. According to one sheik, "In Shiite Islam, leadership comes from Allah, but Allah will not
choose directly. When the people elect a leader, he will be the man selected by Allah, so there is no
contradiction between Islam and democracy."
239 This language was weaker than the CPA wanted, even though the U.S. has no such law.
240 Diamond, supra note 9, at 147, 156.
241 Shari'a law is widely viewed as limiting women's rights to divorce and inheritance.
242 Diamond, supra note 9, at 172 (the provision was initially approved during an unusually poorly
attended meeting of the council).
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 164-65, 167, 171.
246 Diamond, supra note 9, at 173-76.
247 Id. at 177 (these Council members were all Shia Muslims).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 179-85, 197-98.
250 Id.
158 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 15, Issue 2
Withholding Democracy
purely a temporary document, but this came across as dismissive of Iraqi con-
cerns. 2 5 1 Most Iraqis noted the contradiction between the CPA's declared demo-
cratic intent and the lack of opportunity for democratic participation. 2 5 2 If Civic
education must be reinforced by what people see in real life, what the Iraqis
observed was an interim constitution drafted and adopted without national de-
bate; a postponement of direct elections, even at local levels; another round of
appointed government officials; and perpetuation of control by the Governing
Council, most of whom did not enjoy popular support.
In April 2004, the UN sent a new envoy, 253 Lakhdar Brahimi, to Baghdad to
begin the delicate task of constructing the interim government. Most of the exile
politicians resisted this move, believing the UN would ease de-Baathification,254
and insisted on assurances the TAL would not be recognized in any Security
Council resolutions before they would cooperate. 255 Brahimi wanted to cut the
exiles from power and force them to run in the later elections, believing the
leading officials in the interim government should agree not to be candidates for
permanent positions. 2 5 6 Brahimi's first choice for president, Adnan Pachachi, re-
jected the position because he was a strong Arab who did not want to appear
"American". 2 5 7 The top pick for Prime Minister, Adel Abdul Mehdi,258 was ve-
toed by the Governing Council out of fear he would oppose Islamic law. In the
end, Bremer selected Ghazi Al-Yawar 259 for president, an exile who had repeat-
edly thanked President Bush for overthrowing Saddam, and Ayad Allawi 260 was
left as the only remaining suitable candidate for prime minister. The other mem-
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 The first UN Special Envoy to Iraq, Sergio de Mello, was killed when the UN building in Baghdad
was bombed in August 2003.
254 Diamond, supra note 9, at 246-53.
255 These concerns were genuine, as the U.S. intended to seek formal recognition of the TAL by the
Security Council, including it in the same resolution endorsing the new government and formally recog-
nizing Iraqi sovereignty. This would make it far more difficult for the permanent Iraqi government to
drift away from any TAL provisions, thus dispelling the CPA's push it was "merely a temporary
document".
256 Diamond, supra note 9, at 246-53, 257.
257 Pachachi chose to decline the post publicly, stating that he turned down the position "because I
was accused of being the choice of the Americans. I had to refuse this offer, in order to preserve my
reputation and my honor. Trying to portray me as a little soft on the Americans when I have been
struggling for Arab rights all my life is not only false, it is unfair. I find it really insulting." ("Pachachi
Slams 'Dirty Politics' in Iraq", Arab News, June 5, 2004).
258 Mehdi was a trained economist who left Iraq in 1969 for exile in France. He worked for French
think tanks and edited magazines in French and Arabic. He was educated in France, and is the son of a
respected Shiite cleric who was a minister in Iraq's monarchy.
259 Al-Yawar was scheduled to be the last holder of the rotating council presidency, with a term
lasting until 30 June 2004, the date of the expected transition to official Iraqi sovereignty.
260 A prominent Iraqi political activist who lived in exile for almost 30 years, Allawi, a Shia Muslim,
became Iraq's first head of government since Saddam Hussein when the council dissolved on June 1,
2004 and named him Prime Minister of the Iraqi Interim Government. A former Ba'athist, prior to the
war Allawi helped found the Iraqi National Accord, which today is an active political party. In the lead
up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the INA provided intelligence about alleged weapons of mass destruction
to M16. Allawi has lived about half of his life in the UK, and his wife and children still live in Britain for
security reasons.
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bers of the Governing Council reluctantly approved these choices. 26 1 Brahimi
was permitted to select 31 ministers, and he used criteria such as integrity, pro-
fessional experience, and technical competence-factors he had hoped to use for
the entire process. 2 6 2 Only six ministers had ties to major parties and six were
women.263
The new Iraqi Interim Government was appointed on June 2, 2004, and the
UN recognized Iraq's full sovereignty, effective June 30. Bremer went directly to
the airport after the June 28th ceremony and immediately left the country. 2 6 4
During 2004-05, several events would define Iraq's political system: three
elections (two for a national assembly and one a referendum on the constitution),
the drafting of the constitution itself, and the process of forming indigenous na-
tional and provincial governments based on election results. 2 6 5 These were the
first genuinely free elections in Iraq's modern history, but they also solidified
trends already under way: fragmentation of the state along ethnic and sectarian
lines, a weak central government, and a deeply divided political elite. 2 6 6
In November 2004, on-going disagreements among the various factions in the
interim government ultimately resulted in the Sunnis withdrawing from the in-
terim government and boycotting the January 2005 elections. 267 Twenty-three
Shia groups then united to form an alliance in hopes of sweeping the results.2 6 8
On January 30, 2005, the elections for the National Assembly were held. The
overall conduct of the election was in accordance with international standards,
although the turnout was low, especially among Sunni Arabs.2 6 9 Only eight mil-
lion people voted in Iraq's first democratic elections270-less than one-third of
the population and barely half of the registered voters 27 1-a much lower turnout
than was seen in the 1945 occupation elections. The vast majority of seats in the
Assembly went to the Shia alliance, with a small minority going to the Kurds, but
no Sunni representation; of note, the Sunni population generally boycotted even
voting in the elections, thus affecting their legitimacy. 272 Ultimately, the new
261 Diamond, supra note 9, at 258-59, 262.
262 Brahimi expressed frustration and disappointment over his role in Iraq soon after his arrival, going
so far as to call Bremer a "dictator." (quoting Tom Lasseter, UN's Brahimi: Bremer the "Dictator of
Iraq" in Shaping Iraqi Government, KNIGHT-RIDDER, June 3, 2004). He resigned from the UN Envoy
on June 12, 2004, more than two weeks before the official transfer of sovereignty.
263 Diamond, supra note 9, 258-59, 262.
264 Lasseter, supra note 263.
265 Marr, supra note 76, at 287-89, 301-02.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 286.
268 Id. at 287-89, 301-02.
269 U.N. Secretary-General, Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546,15, U.N. Doc. S/2005/141
(Mar. 7, 2005).
270 Id.
271 The World Bank shows the 2005 population of Iraq to have been 27.01 million, with 14.2 million
registered to vote.
272 Sunnis are roughly 1/3 of Iraq's population, a sizeable amount to have denounce the election
process.
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government continued to be led by the exile opposition parties and their leaders,
with a significant shift to the more religiously-oriented parties.2 73
The Transitional Assembly took over for the interim government in May 2005,
and a new constitution was negotiated by Shia and Kurdish members. 2 7 4 When a
draft was presented to the public in August 2005, thousands of Sunnis staged
protests.275 In the referendum for the constitution, two key Sunni provinces re-
jected the document, almost leading to its failure due to Iraq's federal
structure. 276
Following the adoption of the Constitution in October 2005, which vested leg-
islative authority in a council of representatives, national parliamentary elections
were held on December 15, 2005.277
In the end, both elections reinforced Iraq's growing divides, as long delays in
forming a cabinet and indecisions regarding the distribution of power contributed
to the tension. 278 The new permanent government was not in place until May 20,
2006279-nearly two years after the U.S. returned sovereignty. Overall, 2005 saw
powerful factions with armed militias become heads of ministries, positioning
themselves as the new Iraqi oligarchy. 280 These same parties also swept the local
elections, leading to complex power struggles in many areas, including Baghdad,
where the power vacuum soon allowed sectarian and ethnic conflict to spiral out
of control. 28 1 Provincial elections were not held, nor were local or national elec-
tions repeated, until January 31, 2009.282
Many have argued Iraq had only a brief experience with competitive elections
in the 1920s and 30s, and even this was largely a charade. 283 From 1958 to 2003,
Iraqis knew only rule by force. 2 8 4 However, these same attitudes and beliefs were
expressed in regards to Germany and Japan in the 1940s-both were seen as
militaristic and autocratic; both had experienced years of terror and oppression;
and neither had a true democratic government in place. 2 8 5 In fact, each had lived
with democratic elections for only about 15 years before powerful regimes began
273 Marr, supra note 76, at 287-89, 301-02.
274 Id. at 296-300.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 299.
278 Id. at 287-89, 301-02.
279 Id.
280 BRicoux, supra note 104, at 108.
281 Id.
282 Stage being set for Iraqi elections as violence flairs, CNN (Sep. 24, 2008, 2:52 PM), http://www
.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/09/24/Iraq.main/.
283 See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 90.
284 Id.
285 BRIDoUX, supra note 104, at 9.
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to consolidate their power.286 Yet each nation eagerly embraced a return to de-
mocracy and accepted newly implemented democratic ideals. 287
There is no clear reason why local elections, at the least, could not have oc-
curred in Iraq in the fall of 2003 or early spring 2004. The arguments put forth by
Bremer and the CPA do not hold up when compared with the 1945 cases and
their results. First, Bremer asserted he was concerned about the lack of secular
political parties, but these groups still did not fare well in the national elections
two years later. As General Clay learned in Germany, politics in most countries
involves much more than parties and rivalries; there are also social, economic,
and religious outlooks. In Germany, special interests, such as the Catholic
Church and other cliques, were deciding which of their members should be in
office. 288 The same situation occurred in Iraq, but it was not limited or moderated
by a democratic process. 289 By the time the CPA began to initiate steps towards
such a process, most Iraqis were fearful of the notion, believing special interests
groups would simply mandate the outcomes of any elections.290 Bremer's hesi-
tancy only reinforced their fears, since he shared them. What was never ex-
plained to the people of Iraq is the fact that special interest groups play a large
role in all democratic nations-individuals frequently turn to group affiliations,
including religious ones, for guidance on how to vote.
Others have asserted there were no political parties to resurrect in Iraq in the
spring of 2003,291 but this is clearly not true; quite the opposite, in fact. Several
exiled parties eagerly returned to Iraq following the fall of Saddam's regime, and
more internal ones quickly emerged, 292 at much faster rates than they did in ei-
ther Germany or Japan.
National elections in Iraq were also delayed because the CPA found the ideol-
ogies of certain groups distasteful, and they hoped to wait until more desirable
groups could gain power and popularity. 293 This runs counter to Clay's experi-
ence in Germany, where "less desirable groups"-Communists and Catholics-
were the most successful parties in the first election,294 but other groups quickly
got on the bandwagon or risked being ostracized altogether.29 5 Similar to Iraq,
MacArthur decided to have national elections first in Japan, as opposed to local
286 CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ (Cambridge Uni. Press, 3rd Ed.) (2007).
287 See ZiEmKE, supra note 73; see also DowiaR, supra note 139; BRIDOUX, supra note 105.
288 ZIBMKE, supra note 73, at 361-62.
289 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 9 (discussing Sheik Sistani's influence in Iraq, which the CPA
largely ignored).
290 Id.
291 See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 90; MARR, supra note 76; DIAMoNo, supra note 9; BREMER, supra
note 9 (all overviewing the numerous political factions in Iraq in 2003, many of which included armed
militias).
292 Id.
293 Diamond, supra note 9, at 79.
294 ZmMKE, supra note 73, at 362-63.
295 Id.
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ones, but used straight-forward procedures, 296 unlike Bremer's extremely pro-
tracted approach. 2 9 7
Ambassador Bremer thought it would take many months to find and appoint
Iraqis capable of running elections; in 1945, occupation officials simply ran the
elections themselves. In Iraq, it was deemed better to appoint leaders than allow
elections, and more advisable to wait months for the "right" people (who ulti-
mately never materialized or rejected the notion 2 9 8 ) rather than directly oversee
the process.
IV. Proposed Model: Local and Earlier is Better
In December 2017, the Democratic Elections Standards Project at the Carter
Center 299 issued a plan of action for moving towards more defined human rights
and elections standards. 30 The plan noted that while there are several mandates
focused on the rights and freedoms critical to genuine elections, more detailed,
targeted language is needed. 3 01 As noted above, part of the Project's recommen-
dations following a two-year analysis of human rights and elections law is the
development of specific recommendations for a human rights approach to elec-
tions. 30 2 This section attempts to take a first step in that direction by providing a
framework for implementing elections as early as possible following a post-con-
flict occupation. To inform these recommendations, the following sources were
referenced and analyzed: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)
Reference Guide to Democratic Elections Best Practice, 303 the vast collection of
data accumulated by the Carter Center during its lead-up to the December 2017
plan, 3 m and the constitutional framework for provisional self-government in Ko-
soVO 3 0 5 (as an example of a Western-led, post-conflict occupation, though on a
much smaller scale than those discussed above.) Additionally, the occupations of
296 See DOWER, supra note 139, at 4.
297 Marr, supra note 76, at 280.
298 See Pachachi, supra note 257.
299 Human Rights and Election Standards: A Plan of Action, CARTER CIErTrrI (Dec. 1, 2017), https://
www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/human-rights-and-election-standards- 2 018 (a
nongovernmental organization, The Carter Center helps to improve lives by resolving conflicts; advanc-
ing democracy and human rights; preventing diseases; and improving mental health care).
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 OSCE/ODIHR DRAFT PAPER, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND COMMITMENTS ON
THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DEMOCRATIC ELEC-
TIONS BEST PRACTICE, O1Wci FOR DiEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS ANiD HUMAN RIGHTS (Nov. 20,
2002), https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/16859?download=true.
30 CARTER CElNiER, supra note 299.
305 UNMIK REGULATION 2001/9 (May 15, 2001), http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/
FrameworkPocketENGDec2002.pdf.
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Germany, Japan, and Iraq were studied in-depth in order to obtain proper "les-
sons learned" in regards to the timing of election implementation. 30 6
As the case studies above have illustrated, earlier is better when starting a
post-conflict transition to democracy; however, in addition to knowing when to
start, an occupier must also know where. The model framework presented below
will stress the importance of starting at the local level, so as to build citizens'
experiences with democracy before attempting large-scale, national elections
with potentially as-yet-unknown candidates. Think tanks like the RAND Corpo-
ration3 07 have previously recommended local elections be permitted early on,
post-conflict, followed by national elections at a later date. 308 While it is impor-
tant to also establish new national leadership sooner rather than later, since some
new nations (such as Iraq) have neighbors capable of interfering in the elections
process, 3 09 the decision to hold national elections first can actually delay the
installation of a new, permanent government, thus allowing external forces to
exert even more influence on the final outcome.
A. First Steps: Immediately Following Cessation of Conflict
If at all possible, a Security Council resolution should be pursued that both
recognizes the occupation and sets forth the expectation that the occupation's
purpose is to establish and develop meaningful self-government. Such a resolu-
tion-or, if not feasible, a proclamation by the occupier-should note the desire
to respect the will of the people and acknowledge their historical, constitutional,
and legal development. It should make clear the aim of any occupation is to
enable the people to gradually take responsibility for the administration of their
own nation, and that their provisions for self-government will be established
through free and fair elections.
B. Setting Expectations: 1-Month Post-Conflict
When a nation finds itself in the position of Occupying Power following a
conflict, it would benefit from a firmly established set of guidelines, which aim
to root democratic practices within the population as soon as possible. In setting
expectations for the occupied population, however, two major factors must be
recognized: 1) the purpose of the occupation must be to promote stability and
democracy, regardless of the reason behind the conflict (i.e., stop humanitarian
306 Id. (much of the research conducted on each of these nations was done in a multi-factor analysis of
post-conflict occupations conducted by the author for completion of her doctoral dissertation).
307 RAND CORPORATION, https://www.rand.org/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2018) (the RAND Corporation is
a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision-making through research and analysis.
RAND focuses on issues such as health, education, national security, international affairs, law and busi-
ness, the environment, and more. It is funded through government grants and private endowments).
308 Thomas Maulucci, Jr., Comparing the American Occupations of Germany and Iraq, 3 YAt, J.
INT'L AFFAIRS 120, 122 (2008).
309 DOBBINS, BT AL, supra note 71, at 153.
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suffering, remove a dictator, interstate conflict,310 etc.); and 2) the occupier must
have no aims to permanently occupy the territory. If both of these factors are not
present, it is doubtful the occupation would be granted approval, or even acquies-
cence, 3 '' by the international community, causing a different set of variables,
outside the scope of this article, to come into play. If these two factors are pre-
sent, however, it is difficult to imagine a situation where this model could not be
implemented. 3 1 2
As an Occupying Power begins implementing the framework for a new provi-
sional government, it must make clear that all persons-whether appointed to fill
vacant positions, permitted to stay in previously-held posts, or later elected-
must observe internationally-recognized human rights standards .313
In order to promote proper elections, an Occupying Power must immediately
facilitate the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and
assist with the recovery of their property and possessions. 3 14
Local, regional, and national seats of government should remain the same, if
for no other reason than to provide a sense of stability and continuity for the
population; however, Occupation officials should be sensitive to where they es-
tablish their offices and headquarters within these locations. In Iraq, for example,
CPA staff moved into Saddam's former palaces and jails in an attempt to send
the message that the old regime was gone, but what the public saw was simply a
new regime moving in. 3 1 5 Current municipalities and basic territories of self-
310 Rule of Law - Democracy and Human Rights, UNrfED NATIONs HUMAN RIGHTs OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/Pages/Democracy.aspx.
311 Id. (in 2003, the U.S. was not granted approval by the Security Council to invade Iraq; however, it
was later recognized as an occupying force in the country, along with Great Britain).
312 See ZIEMCKE, supra note 73 (though many argue the security situation in Iraq made it far too
difficult to begin a grassroots democratic movement, as the case study on Iraq illustrates, such an effort
was never on the agenda, and the Iraqi people knew it. Also, while the CPA faced many obstacles in Iraq
in regards to security issues (many of which it could-and has-been argued were of their own mak-
ing-see Diamond's and Van Buren's work, specifically, for more discussion of this issue), the Allied
powers in Germany and Japan faced as least as challenging a situation due to massive humanitarian
crises).
313 Id. (at a minimum, provisional institutions and their officers should be informed of the require-
ments within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The occupier should ascertain those instruments commonly accepted regionally (such as
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms), as well as other interna-
tional protocols that may be applicable, generally. While this may include treaties or other forms of
international agreements to which the occupied nation is not a party, it is important to note the provi-
sional government will not be bound by the entirety of these protocols; rather, they will merely be
expected to uphold the notions of individual liberties and protections found in these documents. Doing so
will present a firm commitment to democracy and human rights on behalf of the new government.).
314 Id. (in Germany, for example, after V-E Day, SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters - Allied Expedi-
tionary Force) officials estimated the total number of displaced persons (DPs) in SHAEF-held territory-
including those already repatriated-to be 5.2 million. The western Europeans were leaving as fast as
transportation could be provided, at a rate of 200,000 a week in May. In June, the rate of Soviet DP
repatriation reached 250,000 per week; however, towards the end of the year, this number would actually
swell, as native Germans were expelled from other nations and Soviet citizens fled for Western territory.
Nonetheless, all DPs were given priority transportation and found housing within a year.) See also
ZiEMCKE, supra note 73.
315 See Diamond, supra note 9 (the U.S. and CPA officials simply reconstituted much of Saddam's
property for their own use-Saddam's Presidential Palace became CPA Headquarters, and later the U.S.
Volume 15, Issue 2 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 165
Withholding Democracy
government should be maintained, and it must be clearly communicated to local
agencies and institutions that they should keep functioning,3 16 though purges and
new appointed leaders may come later. Low-to-mid level bureaucracies must
continue to operate, even with less-than-ideal staffing, facilities and experience,
because these services have the most direct impact on every-day lives of citizens.
It is especially important that this message be sent to local law and order offi-
cials, provided they were not complicit in human rights violations under the pre-
vious regime. 3 17
C. Establishing Interim Processes: 1-3 Months Post-Conflict
Ideally, even prior to the end of hostilities, an Occupying Power will have
considered whether they will purge the bulk of the defeated government or allow
certain levels or positions to remain in place to help administer the nation. Part of
this decision will rely on practical matters: in Germany, there was a clear "Nazi
litmus test" that could be used to identify "undesirables", at least in the begin-
ning; 3 18 in Japan, no such test existed, and other factors-such as language and
technical barriers-made it more appealing to leave most Japanese officials in
place and only purge the top levels. In Iraq, such a litmus test was available
through membership in the Baath Party, and an approach similar to that in Ger-
many was used-complete purging from government posts of all members. 3 19
Unfortunately, despite lessons learned in Germany in regards to the numerous
setbacks the de-Nazification program faced,320 the CPA pushed ahead with full
de-Baathification in Iraq. 3 2 1 The result was an utterly non-functioning state and a
complete power vacuum. Thus, it is vital an Occupying Power understand not
just the "face" of a possible political enemy, but the depths of its nature, as
well-most Nazis and Baath Party members were members in name only, and
did not actually support the groups' aims. 3 2 2
Regardless of which approach is selected (total purge vs. top level, or a combi-
nation of the two), some positions will need to be filled. The starting point should
always be at the local level, which requires occupation personnel to operate
Embassy; other luxurious buildings, as well as privately-owned factories, were confiscated by the mili-
tary and later "gifted" back to the Iraqis).
316 Id. (in Iraq, practically every soldier, law enforcement official, and government employee simply
went home and never returned to work following the invasion. The result was a complete halting of all
government services and lack of infrastructure maintenance, including water and sewage).
317 Id. (if so, a more immediate purge may be required, with rank-and-file officers remaining on staff
to serve under occupation leadership).
318 See ZmMcICE, supra note 119 (regarding the various approaches to de-Nazification in Germany).
319 See Diamond, supra note 9; Bremer, supra note 9, at 57 (for detailed discussions of the de-
Baathification program implemented by the CPA in Iraq, see Diamond's work).
320 See ZIEMCKE, supra note 119.
321 See Bremer, supra note 9 (Bremer accomplished this with CPA Order #1, De-Baathification,
which he issued on May 16, 2003).
322 See ZIEMK, supra note 119, at 380-82 (during the author's deployment to Iraq in 2008, dozens of
Iraqis discussed the near-mandatory nature of Baath Party membership. One gentleman who worked at
the Central Criminal Court in Baghdad stated "your kids could not play soccer [at] school if you were not
a member.").
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within communities, not behind walls. Potential local leaders should be identified
and approached to ascertain their willingness to serve. Ironically, political prison-
ers could be a great source of manpower in this endeavor, as enemies of a previ-
ous despotic regime could be powerful allies in democratic thought.323 Most
importantly, however, occupation officials should not attempt to skew appoint-
ments in favor of any one party or group, and should rely heavily on the wishes
of the public, even if the result is "less desirable" candidates. Forcing selections
on an unsupportive public would only serve to breed resentment towards the
Occupation's stated goals, as Iraq clearly illustrates.
Exiled politicians should only be used in the new government if it is clear the
public desires their return and supports their candidacy; otherwise, these individ-
uals could be viewed as "elitists" who fled a bad situation while others remained
to suffer.324 At a minimum, a new nation should never be ruled entirely by exiles,
especially those who have been away from the country for several years, if not
decades.
Any individuals appointed or otherwise selected by occupation officials to
serve in an interim capacity should be prohibited from candidacy in the first
round of elections. This prohibition helps to eliminate favoritism (as well as the
perception of it) and promotes an even playing field among the candidates.
D. Implementing Elections: 3-6 Months Post-Conflict
A date for local and regional elections, within this same time frame, should be
set. Voting districts should be drawn with a view to providing regional equality
and on the basis of objective criteria, such as population or geography, but tradi-
tion can also be a factor. If possible, current districts, or those in use before the
previous regime came to power, should be maintained. If voter rolls are not read-
ily available, other means of accounting for citizens can be used, based on availa-
ble data. In Iraq, for example, information regarding payouts under the UN's Oil
for Food program were used to establish the initial census following the war.3 2 5
A process for registering and approving political parties should be imple-
mented, as well as a method for candidates to file for participation in a certain
race. This process may or may not include a vetting process before a candidate
can be placed on the ballot.
Potential candidates, political parties, and voters should be informed of the
rules for the elections. These rules must be easily understood, published, and
323 Id. (in Germany, for example, many future leaders were discovered amongst the concentration
camp survivors).
324 See Diamond, supra note 9 (this fact was frequently used in Iraq by those who distrusted the
Governing Council, especially since most members were quite wealthy).
325 OFFIC: Oz THi7 SprcIAL INsPEci'oR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, APPLYNG IRAQ'S HARD
LESSONS TO THE REFORM AND RECONSTRucTION o STABILIZATION OPERATIONS (2010), http://www
.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a5 15368.pdf (during the wide-spread looting that occurred following the coali-
tion forces' arrival in Bagdad, the director of computer services at the Ministry of Trade secured the list
of every Iraqi household eligible for food rations. After the official list vanished amid the looting, this
copy was later used as a basis for registering voters in Iraq's first democratic elections).
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made public, and should include the manner and location of voting, as well as
any information necessary for a voter to cast a valid ballot.
It must be determined if Occupation officials will oversee the elections, or if
there is a sufficient number of local appointees available to do so.
E. Selecting the Provisional Government: 6-9 Months Post-Conflict
Direct elections for local leaders should be held, followed soon after by re-
gional elections. Judicial functions should be transferred to newly elected judges.
Regional leaders should be heavily involved in discussions with Occupation offi-
cials regarding whether the first national election should rely on regional voting
or a single, multi-member district. This decision, obviously, relies heavily on the
ethnic, social, and political make-up of the country, as well as geography, popu-
lation, and size.
F. Transfer of Sovereignty: 9-12 Months Post-Conflict
Direct elections should be held for at least one chamber of the national parlia-
ment or legislature. Following this first election of national leaders, it can be
determined if a bicameral approach is preferred. Terms for these positions should
be short-no more than two years-with reelection permitted. The main purpose
of this provisional national parliament is to draft a new constitution, but its insti-
tutions would also have responsibility for greater governmental functions, includ-
ing economic, financial, and fiscal policy; trade; health, welfare, and education
programs; and labor, development, and environmental protection.
In regards to the drafting process, the occupier and the new parliament should
work together to ensure certain provisions are enshrined in the constitution; for
example, language should be included regarding basic electoral rights, due pro-
cess, and equal protection under the law. Following approval of the constitution
and passage of a public referendum, the Occupying Power should take all neces-
sary measures to transfer powers and responsibilities to the provisional
government.
If there is more than one nationally recognized or predominant language in a
nation, each translated version of the constitution should be considered authentic,
but one language should be selected to prevail in case conflict.
G. On-Going Responsibilities of the Occupying Power
For the duration of this transitional period, maintenance of law and order
within the nation remains the prime responsibility of the Occupying Power.
Though it may utilize native law enforcement agencies, law and order is of fun-
damental importance and cannot be passed off to a not-yet-steady government.
This is why, often, even after the transfer of sovereignty, Occupation troops and
other officials remain in-country. 326 This law and order responsibility includes
326 Francisco Sagasti, "A human rights approach to democratic governance and development" Realiz-
ing the Right to Development, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Dec. 31, 2013),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/RTDBook/PartilChapter9.pdf.
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maintaining border security (a task largely ignored in Iraq, due to insufficient
troop numbers), regulating possession of firearms, enforcing public safety regula-
tions and laws, and conducting functions that aid in civil emergencies.
While elections are a critical way to promote a stable political environment in
which human rights can flourish, it should be made clear that elections-even at
the national level-are not, by themselves, an exit strategy; rather, they must be
part of a long-term, institution-building process. 327 While it may be necessary to
post-pone elections due to security concerns, the nature of the security problems
must be strongly considered, and elections should never be postponed solely
from fear of their results. Such security concerns are yet another reason to start
elections at the local level, where greater oversight and control can be imple-
mented and adapted, as needed, rather than starting on a grand scale with near-
insurmountable obstacles. Iraq faced clear security concerns in 2003; however,
most of the violence was not widespread until July 2003 328-in other words, the
CPA had more than two months to make an impact, during which their main
statements related to delaying the return of sovereignty and postponement of
elections. Germany and Japan were the losers in the most destructive war in
history; their cities were destroyed, millions were homeless, countless others
were starving or ill.329 Yet both were well on the road to democracy within less
than a year. While there are other factors to consider, 330 the timeliness of their
democratic experience is, without a doubt, a significant point.
V. Conclusion
Lessons learned in 1945 should have been obvious in 2003, and Iraq now
illustrates these points even more strongly. First, local, direct elections are an
important stepping-stone and occupation authorities should not wait for more
"desirable" parties to emerge. If the people are unhappy with their options, they
will work to make more. Second, occupation officials should use the power they
have to move the process along. If there are no election laws, draft them; no voter
rolls, create them3 31 . All this can be accomplished while still making it clear the
new government will have the power to implement new laws, as appropriate.
Finally, potential (and aspiring) national leaders must be held accountable. In-
terim appointees and other officials must not be allowed to hamstring the demo-
cratic process. Large committees and councils should be used with caution, as
various obstacles to consensus will only stall the proceedings.
327 Id.
328 See Diamond, supra note 9; Bremer, supra note 9.
329 See ZimIcKE, supra note 73.
330 Id. (for example, security concerns, population cohesion, occupation legitimacy, consistency of
governance, etc.).
331 See Diamond, supra note 9 (there is significant debate over whether voter rolls existed in Iraq; in
fact, they did. Elections were routinely held under the Baath regime, though they were not competitive
and largely for show. Nonetheless, voting districts comprised of approximately 250,000 people were
well-established, able to serve at least as a starting point for future elections).
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Between 1949 and 1960, the economy in West Germany grew at an unparal-
leled rate: low rates of inflation, modest wage increases and a quickly rising
export quota made it possible to restore the economy and brought a modest pros-
perity. 3 3 2 According to official statistics the German gross national product grew
in average by about 7% annually between 1950 and 1960.333 Three national dem-
ocratic elections were held, each resulting in a peaceful transfer of power. 334
During the same time frame, Japan saw its economy and education system reor-
ganized and rebuilt. A former enemy, it also became a Western ally, and began to
find its economic footing as a manufacturer of consumer devices and electron-
ics. 3 35 In contrast, the 15 years since Iraq's occupation began have seen contin-
ued violence, widespread ethnic cleansing, and an on-going insurgency that
culminated in a civil war.3 3 6 Its first democratically-elected Prime Minister,
Nouri al-Maliki, was forced to resign on August 14, 2014.337
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